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I. INTRODUCTION1 
The Supreme Court of Canada made a declaration of Aboriginal title for the first 
time in 2014 in its landmark Tsilhqot’in Nation2 decision, a decision with “ground-
                                                
*  Robert Hamilton, BA (St. Thomas University), JD (UNB), LLM (York University), Ph.D. Student 
(University of Victoria Faculty of Law).  
1  This paper has been adapted from an LLM Thesis: Robert Hamilton, “They Promised to Leave Us Some 
of Our Land”: Aboriginal Title in Canada’s Maritime Provinces (LLM Thesis, York University 
Osgoode Hall Law School, 2015) [unpublished] [Hamilton, Aboriginal Title in Canada’s Maritime 
Provinces]. 
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shifting implications.”3 Governments and First Nations across the country are only 
beginning to adjust to the consequences of the decision, which may be particularly 
impactful in areas where it is acknowledged that Aboriginal title has never been 
ceded, such as the Maritime Provinces.4 The only Aboriginal title case from the 
region that has reached the Supreme Court left several important doctrinal questions 
unanswered and, as will be explained, should not be read as precluding a future 
finding of title in the region. As such, Aboriginal title in the Maritime Provinces 
must be assessed in light of the principles articulated in Tsilhqot’in. This is 
particularly important at this time, as unresolved title issues have contributed to 
disputes over resource development in the region and more conflict is likely while 
title issues remain outstanding.  
This paper analyzes Aboriginal title in the Maritime Provinces in light of 
the Tsilhqot’in decision with the aim of providing insight into how future title 
litigation emerging from the region may be assessed in the courts. I begin by 
reviewing the Supreme Court’s ruling in Tsilhqot’in—specifically, the Court’s 
adoption of the territorial approach to Aboriginal title claims. On the basis of this 
approach, and referring to case law and relevant historical materials, I argue that 
Aboriginal title existed in the region at the time of the assertion of British 
sovereignty. While concluding that title undoubtedly existed in the region, I stop 
short of attempting to determine where it may have existed, for such a determination 
would require a depth of research not possible here. Having concluded that title 
existed, I review the legal framework governing the extinguishment of Aboriginal 
title to assess whether Aboriginal title has been extinguished in the Maritime 
Provinces. I conclude that Aboriginal title has likely not been extinguished on a large 
scale, a conclusion which strongly suggests that Aboriginal title continues to exist in 
the region today. Finally, I point to some further issues raised by this conclusion.   
II. SITE-SPECIFIC/INTENSIVE USE VS. TERRITORIAL/EXCLUSIVE OCCUPATION 
In Tsilhqot’in, the Supreme Court clarified the ‘site-specific’ and ‘territorial’ 
approaches to Aboriginal title.5 The site-specific approach conceives of title as 
applying to small tracts or plots of land surrounded by larger areas over which other 
Aboriginal or treaty rights may exist. 6  The territorial approach, by contrast, 
                                                                                                               
2  Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44, [2014] 2 SCR 257 (CanLII) [Tsilhqot’in Nation]. 
3  John Borrows, “The Durability of Terra Nullius: Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia (2015) 48:3 
UBC L Rev 701 at 704 (QL).  
4  This is not to suggest that the numbered treaties, often assumed to have extinguished title, should be 
assumed to have done so. For an argument challenging the view that Treaty One cedes land, see Aimée 
Craft, Breathing Life into the Stone Fort Treaty: An Anishinabe Understanding of Treaty One 
(Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2013). For the same concerning Treaty Nine, see John S Long, Treaty 
No 9: Making the Agreement to Share the Land in Far Northern Ontario in 1905 (Montreal & Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010). 
5  For a discussion of site-specific vs. territorial conceptions of Aboriginal title, see Kent McNeil, 
“Aboriginal Title in Canada: Site-Specific or Territorial?” (2014) 91:3 Can Bar Rev 745. 
6  Such Aboriginal or treaty rights include, for instance, hunting and fishing rights.  
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conceives of title as applying to broad, contiguous tracts of land. In Tsilhqot’in, the 
unanimous Court held the territorial approach to be correct. The distinction between 
the approaches, and the differing results that emerge from each, can be seen clearly 
in how the two standards have been applied by the courts.  
The trial judge in Tsilhqot’in applied a territorial standard and “held that 
‘occupation’ was established for the purpose of proving title by showing regular and 
exclusive use of sites or territory.”7 According to the trial judge, title might be found 
not only to intensively used sites (e.g., villages, fishing holes, and agricultural sites), 
but also to broad tracts of exclusively used or controlled territory.8 The British 
Columbia Court of Appeal, on the other hand, applied a site-specific standard, 
requiring proof that “a definite tract of land with reasonably defined boundaries” was 
used regularly and intensively.9 At the Supreme Court, McLachlin CJC articulated 
the distinction between the two approaches:  
For semi-nomadic Aboriginal groups like the Tsilhqot’in, the Court of 
Appeal’s approach results in small islands of title surrounded by larger 
territories where the group possesses only Aboriginal rights to engage in 
activities like hunting and trapping. By contrast, on the trial judge’s 
approach, the group would enjoy title to all the territory that their 
ancestors regularly and exclusively used at the time of assertion of 
European sovereignty.10 
Correlative to the territorial approach to title is a shift in emphasis regarding the 
degree of occupancy required to demonstrate title. The reason for this is clear: 
Requiring proof of intensive use of land would necessarily limit the scope of territory 
over which such use could be proven, while an emphasis on control and exclusive 
occupation of territory necessarily leads title to be recognized to broader areas.  
Despite the existence of two clearly different standards, the test for 
establishing title has, on the surface, remained unchanged since Delgamuukw.11 Title 
is established by demonstrating occupation at the date of the assertion of British 
sovereignty.12 Aboriginal occupation must possess three characteristics at the date of 
sovereignty in order to ground a finding of Aboriginal title: “It must be sufficient; it 
must be continuous (where present occupation is relied on); and it must be 
exclusive.”13 The contrast between the territorial and site-specific conceptions of 
                                                
7  Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 2 at para 27. 
8  Ibid.  
9  Ibid at para 28. 
10  Ibid at para 29. 
11 Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010, 153 DLR (4th) 193 (CanLII) [Delgamuukw cited 
to SCR]. 
12 Ibid at para 155; R v Marshall; R v Bernard, 2005 SCC 43 at para 40, [2005] 2 SCR 220 (CanLII) 
[Marshall; Bernard]; Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 2 at para 25. 
13 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 2 at para 25 [emphasis in original]. 
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title, then, involves matters of interpretation rather than a wholesale rewriting of the 
test. In particular, courts applying the territorial conception have emphasized control 
and exclusive occupation of territory, while those applying the site-specific standard 
have required intensive use of sites and have placed a greater emphasis on the degree 
of occupation sufficient to establish title.14  
A. Sufficiency and Exclusivity  
The Supreme Court in Tsilhqot’in held that, in assessing sufficiency of occupation, 
courts must look to “both the common law perspective and the Aboriginal 
perspective.”15 The common law supplies “the idea of possession and control of the 
lands.”16 The common law is concerned not with the intensive use of a given site, but 
with the effective control of territory: “At common law, possession extends beyond 
sites that are physically occupied, like a house, to surrounding lands that are used 
and over which effective control is exercised.”17 This approach emphasizes control 
as opposed to use as the most important factor in establishing the sufficiency of 
occupation required to prove the existence of Aboriginal title.18  
Determining “[s]ufficiency of occupation is a context-specific inquiry.”19 
Courts must draw on the unique factual circumstances of the Aboriginal group in 
question to expand the acceptable indicia of occupation beyond merely “the 
construction of dwellings through cultivation and enclosure of fields” to include the 
“regular use of definite tracts of land for hunting, fishing or otherwise exploiting its 
resources.”20 This inquiry must take into consideration, for example, the carrying 
capacity of the land in assessing the degree of occupancy required to prove title; if 
the land could only support 1,000 people, the fact that it was not more densely 
populated cannot be used as evidence of an absence of use or occupation.21 As 
McLachlin CJC stated in Tsilhqot’in, “[t]he intensity and frequency of the use 
[required to establish sufficient occupation] may vary with the characteristics of the 
                                                
14  Joshua Nichols, “Claims of Sovereignty—Burdens of Occupation: William and the Future of 
Reconciliation” (2015) 48:1 UBC L Rev 221 at 221 (QL).  
15 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 2 at para 34; Delgamuukw, supra note 11 at para 147.  
16 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 2 at para 36. 
17 Ibid.  
18 Kent McNeil, “Exclusive Occupation and Joint Aboriginal Title” (2015) 48:3 UBC L Rev 821 at 828 
(QL). 
19 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 2 at para 37. The purpose of this “context-specific inquiry” is to give 
substance to the “Aboriginal perspective”: ibid at para 34.  
20 Ibid at para 37, citing Delgamuukw, supra note 11 at para 149. 
21 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 2 at para 37. 
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Aboriginal group asserting title and the character of the land over which title is 
asserted.”22  
To fulfill the sufficiency requirement, an Aboriginal group must 
demonstrate “that it has historically acted in a way that would communicate to third 
parties that it held the land for its own purposes.”23 Though evidence for this cannot 
be purely subjective or internal to the Aboriginal peoples making the claim, “[t]his 
standard does not demand notorious or visible use akin to proving a claim for 
adverse possession.”24 Courts will require objective evidence of 
… a strong presence on or over the land claimed, manifesting itself in acts 
of occupation that could reasonably be interpreted as demonstrating that 
the land in question belonged to, was controlled by, or was under the 
exclusive stewardship of the claimant group.25  
Sufficiency of occupation is determined not with reference to the use of the land, but 
with respect to “acts of occupation” which demonstrate that the territory “belonged 
to” or was “controlled by” the Indigenous peoples making the claim.26 The ‘acts of 
occupation’ that may suffice to demonstrate such possession and control will vary 
from group to group. As the Supreme Court held in Tsilhqot’in, “[c]ultivated fields, 
constructed dwelling houses, invested labour, and a consistent presence on parts of 
the land may be sufficient, but are not essential to establish occupation.”27 Instead, 
the Court adopted an analogy to the common law concept of general occupancy, 
holding that occupation can be demonstrated where a group asserts possession of 
territory “over which no one else has a present interest or with respect to which title 
is uncertain.”28  
While the common law requirement of possession remains, that requirement 
must be informed in a “culturally sensitive” manner by the “Aboriginal perspective” 
of the group in question, a perspective which may be ascertained with reference to 
“its laws, practices, size, technological ability and the character of the land 
claimed.”29 Occupation, then, is sufficient to ground title where the group bringing a 
title claim can demonstrate that it asserted possession of the territory in question at 
the date of sovereignty, an assertion which can be supported by bringing evidence of 
                                                
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid at para 38. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid at para 39, citing R v Marshall, 2003 NSCA 105 at para 36, 218 NSR (2d) 78 (CanLII), Cromwell 
JA [Marshall (NSCA)], citing Kent McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Clarendon Pres, 
1989) at 198–200 [McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title]. 
29 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 2 at para 41. I discuss the ‘Aboriginal perspective’ in more detail below. 
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acts of occupation which indicate control or exclusive stewardship, the indication of 
which must be assessed with reference to the Aboriginal perspective. On the basis of 
this understanding of sufficiency, the Court in Tsilhqot’in concluded:  
There is no suggestion in the jurisprudence or scholarship that Aboriginal 
title is confined to specific village sites or farms, as the Court of Appeal 
held. Rather, a culturally sensitive approach suggests that regular use of 
territories for hunting, fishing, trapping and foraging is “sufficient” use to 
ground Aboriginal title, provided that such use, on the facts of a particular 
case, evinces an intention on the part of the Aboriginal group to hold or 
possess the land in a manner comparable to what would be required to 
establish title at common law.30 
The territorial conception of title, then, seeks an intention to retain exclusive control 
over the land. 
In addition to sufficiency of occupation, a court will also look to the 
exclusivity of historical occupation in assessing title. Exclusivity can be 
demonstrated by illustrating “the intention and capacity to control the land” over 
which title is asserted.31 Exclusivity is based not on use of the land, but on control of 
it. This is reflected in Lamer CJC’s (as he then was) statement in Delgamuukw: 
Finally, at sovereignty, occupation must have been exclusive. The 
requirement for exclusivity flows from the definition of aboriginal title 
itself, because I have defined aboriginal title in terms of the right to 
exclusive use and occupation of land. Exclusivity, as an aspect of 
aboriginal title, vests in the aboriginal community which holds the ability 
to exclude others from the lands held pursuant to that title. The proof of 
title must, in this respect, mirror the content of the right.32  
Put otherwise, since a finding of Aboriginal title confers a right to exclusive 
occupation, such occupation is required to prove the existence of such title. The 
intention to control the land which characterizes exclusive occupation can be 
demonstrated by proving “that others were excluded from the land” or “that others 
were only allowed access to the land with the permission of the claimant group.”33 
This is the sense in which exclusivity was assessed at trial in Tsilhqot’in, where 
Vickers J “found that the Tsilhqot’in, prior to the assertion of sovereignty, repelled 
other people from their land and demanded permission from outsiders who wished to 
pass over it,” and “concluded from this that the Tsilhqot’in treated the land as 
exclusively theirs.”34 
                                                
30 Ibid at para 42. 
31 Ibid at para 48.  
32 Delgamuukw, supra note 11 at para 155 [emphasis in original]. 
33 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 2 at para 48. 
34 Ibid at para 58.   
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As with the sufficiency analysis, the assessment of exclusivity must be 
based on the common law and Aboriginal perspectives.35 Courts have had some 
difficulty in this regard and, as a result, the ‘Aboriginal perspective’ has been defined 
and applied unevenly.36  
In Delgamuukw and Tsilhqot’in, the Aboriginal perspective is discussed in 
two important ways. First, incorporation of the Aboriginal perspective requires that 
courts interpret historical facts in a manner that does not unfairly prejudice 
Aboriginal claimants (e.g., by looking to the carrying capacity of territory in 
interpreting what population numbers say about the intensity of land use).37 Second, 
it requires that Aboriginal laws and legal traditions inform the characteristics of title 
itself. As Lamer CJC stated in Delgamuukw, Aboriginal title is “sui generis in the 
sense that its characteristics cannot be completely explained by reference either to 
the common law rules of real property or to the rules of property found in aboriginal 
legal systems.”38 In other words, the characteristics of the interest protected by 
Aboriginal title are shaped in part by Aboriginal legal systems. 
Indigenous laws can also serve to demonstrate exclusivity of occupation. In 
Delgamuukw, Lamer CJC employed terms such as ‘trespass’ and ‘permission’ while 
discussing the role of Indigenous laws.39 Lamer CJC recognized that access to 
Indigenous lands was regulated by Indigenous laws: “aboriginal laws under which 
permission may be granted to other aboriginal groups to use or reside even 
temporarily on land would reinforce the finding of exclusive occupation.”40  It 
                                                
35 Ibid at para 49; Delgamuukw, supra note 11 at para 156. 
36 For a discussion of the problematic manner in which the “Aboriginal perspective” was conceived in 
Marshall; Bernard, see Nigel Bankes, “Marshall and Bernard: Ignoring the Relevance of Customary 
Property Laws” (2006) 55 UNBLJ 120. Bankes argues at 127 that “while the court recites the relevant 
approach it pays little more than lip service to the importance of considering the aboriginal perspective 
precisely because the majority opinion decontextualizes the aboriginal practices from their normative 
setting.” 
37 Ibid at 126. See also Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 2 at paras 35–38; Marshall; Bernard, supra note 12 
at paras 45–50. 
38 Delgamuukw, supra note 11 at para 112. 
39 Ibid at paras 156–157. 
40 Ibid. The question may be raised as to why it is only the granting of permission to other Aboriginal 
groups to use or occupy land that may reinforce the exclusivity of occupation in this manner. This 
requirement would seem to tether the test for Aboriginal title not to the date of sovereignty, as required, 
but instead to the date of contact as in respect of “lesser” Aboriginal rights. If granting permission to 
non-Aboriginal groups could strengthen a claim in the same manner as granting permission to 
Aboriginal groups can, the Acadian presence should be carefully assessed. Olive Dickason, for example, 
argues that the Mi’kmaq understood the Acadians to have only a usufructuary right to the lands they 
occupied in Acadia and that the territory remained part of the Mi’kmaq domain: Olive Patricia 
Dickason, Canada’s First Nations: A History of Founding Peoples from Earliest Times (Toronto: 
McClelland & Stewart, 1992) at 108 [Dickason, Canada’s First Nations]. 
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follows that those laws may be invoked to demonstrate the “intention and capacity to 
retain exclusive control” over the lands.41 
This consideration was lost in the Marshall; Bernard decision, where 
McLachlin CJC reduced the incorporation of the Aboriginal perspective to a 
translation of historical practices to contemporary common law rights. 42  The 
importance of Indigenous laws, however, was revived in Tsilhqot’in through the 
emphasis on effective control of territory and a move away from the process of 
‘translation’ that characterized the analysis in Marshall; Bernard.43 The Aboriginal 
perspective, in each of the senses discussed above, is essential to the assessment of 
both sufficiency and exclusivity. Indeed, in Tsilhqot’in, McLachlin CJC held that the 
incorporation of the Aboriginal perspective requires that sufficiency and exclusivity 
not be assessed as distinct requirements that must be satisfied: “Sufficiency, 
continuity and exclusivity are not ends in themselves, but inquiries that shed light on 
whether Aboriginal title is established.”44 McLachlin CJC explicitly questioned how 
conceptually distinct “the three elements of the Delgamuukw test” should remain, 
asking whether to consider each characteristic “independently, or as related aspects 
of a single concept.”45 In response, she quoted the High Court of Australia’s decision 
in Western Australia v Ward,46 where the Court held that the test for Aboriginal title, 
when taken as a whole, describes “a particular measure of control over access to 
land” and that “to speak of ‘possession’ of the land, as distinct from possession to the 
exclusion of all others, invites attention to the common law content of the concept of 
possession and whatever notions of control over access might be thought to be 
attached to it.”47 
Thus, McLachlin CJC held that, while these concepts are “useful lenses 
through which to view the question of Aboriginal title,”48 courts must be cautious not 
to employ them in such a manner so as “to lose or distort the Aboriginal perspective 
by forcing ancestral practices into the square boxes of common law concepts.”49 
Sufficiency, continuity, and exclusivity are, therefore, framed as characteristics of 
Aboriginal title that can be used to assist a court in determining whether title existed, 
not strict requirements for proving title. Occupation may be established with 
reference to both physical occupation, drawing on the common law, and exclusive 
                                                
41 Ibid at para 156, citing McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra note 28 at 204. 
42 Marshall; Bernard, supra note 12 at para 70. 
43 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 2 at para 50.  
44 Ibid at para 32.  
45 Ibid at para 31. 
46 Western Australia v Ward, [2002] HCA 28, 213 CLR 1 (AustLII) [Ward cited to CLR]. 
47 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 2 at para 31, citing Ward, supra note 46 at para 89. 
48 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 2 at para 32. 
49 Ibid. 
66 UNBLJ     RD UN-B [VOL/TOME 67 
 
control, drawing on both the common law and Indigenous law.50 The role of 
Indigenous legal systems, then, is central both in shaping the type of occupation 
required to prove title and as evidence of that occupation.  
The extent to which sufficiency and exclusivity should be considered “as 
related aspects of a single concept” is reflected in the similarity between the two 
concepts in Tsilhqot’in. As discussed above, the determination of sufficiency has 
come to be assessed to a large extent on the basis of whether the claimant group 
“acted in a way that would communicate to third parties that it held the land for its 
own purposes” and “that the land in question belonged to, was controlled by, or was 
under the exclusive stewardship of the claimant group.”51 The exclusivity analysis, 
for its part, looks to the “intention and capacity to control the land.”52 While the 
analysis of each characteristic remains distinct, the overriding emphasis for the Court 
is determining whether “the group exercised effective control at the time of assertion 
of European sovereignty.”53 
B. Continuity  
Continuity is required “[w]here present occupation is relied on as proof of 
occupation pre-sovereignty.”54 In such cases, there must be continuity between pre-
sovereignty and present occupation. 55  A court may not infer pre-sovereignty 
occupation from present occupation. The continuity requirement has sometimes been 
interpreted to mean that an Indigenous group seeking to establish title must 
demonstrate continuity between its occupation at the time of the British assertion of 
sovereignty and its present occupation. However, as Cromwell JA, then of the Nova 
Scotia Court of Appeal, stated in Marshall: 
…continuity of occupation from sovereignty to the present is not part of 
the test for aboriginal title if exclusive occupation at sovereignty is 
established by direct evidence of occupation before and at the time of 
sovereignty. This view is consistent with the basic principle underpinning 
Delgamuukw that title crystalizes at that time. It also responds to the 
concern that requiring continuity of occupation after sovereignty would 
undermine the purpose of s. 35 by giving effect to displacement of 
aboriginals by Europeans as a result of post-sovereignty indifference to 
aboriginal rights.56  
                                                
50 Delgamuukw, supra note 11 at para 114; Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 2 at para 41; Brian Slattery, 
“The Metamorphosis of Aboriginal Title” (2006) 85 Can Bar Rev 255 at 270. 
51 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 2 at para 38. 
52 Ibid at para 48. 
53 Ibid at para 50.  
54 Ibid at para 45. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Marshall (NSCA), supra note 28 at para 181. 
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In other words, requiring continuity between occupation at the time of sovereignty 
and occupation in the current day would undermine section 35 by legitimizing the 
dispossession of Indigenous peoples. Aboriginal title, as a concept, would be 
fundamentally altered and divorced from its historical roots as a right grounded in 
pre-sovereignty occupation of territory. A continuity ‘requirement’ would introduce 
a new mode of extinguishing title, which would see any displacement of Aboriginal 
peoples between the date of sovereignty and the present day as validly extinguishing 
title. 57  Present occupation is evidence that can be relied upon to help prove 
occupation at the date of sovereignty. Continuity only arises when present 
occupation is relied on in this manner and is not a requirement for proving title in 
and of itself.58 
III. PROOF OF TITLE IN THE MARITIME PROVINCES 
A. The Marshall and Bernard Decisions 
The unambiguous reliance on the territorial/exclusive occupation approach in 
Tsilhqot’in provides important guidance in assessing both future claims and the 
precedential value of past decisions. In the Maritime Provinces, courts have applied 
both the territorial and site-specific standards, with predictably variable results. In 
the only title case from the region to reach the Supreme Court, Marshall; Bernard, 
the Court rendered a highly ambiguous decision which left the applicable standard 
unclear. Past decisions of the lower courts and potential future claims in the 
Maritime Provinces must therefore be assessed in light of the clarification provided 
in Tsilhqot’in. The trial and appellate decisions in the Marshall; Bernard litigation, 
in particular, require revisiting.  
At issue in Marshall; Bernard were appeals from two cases in which 
Mi’kmaw59 individuals were charged with illegally removing timber from Crown 
lands. Marshall emerged from Nova Scotia; Bernard, from New Brunswick. In both 
cases the defence argued that, as the Mi’kmaq held rights to harvest lumber pursuant 
either to treaty or to Aboriginal title, provincial authorization to do so was not 
required.60 The defendants in both cases were convicted at trial. In both cases the 
                                                
57 See also Kent McNeil, “Continuity of Aboriginal Rights”, in Kerry Wilkins, ed, Advancing Aboriginal 
Claims: Visions/Strategies/Directions (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing Ltd, 2004) at 127–150. 
58 Marshall (NSCA), supra note 28 at para 242. 
59 A note on spelling: “The word Mi’kmaq is plural and is also used when referring to the whole nation. 
For instance: ‘The Mi’kmaq of Eastern Canada.’ Mi’kmaw is the singular and adjectival form of 
Mi’kmaq. Examples: ‘I am a Mi’kmaw’ or ‘A Mi’kmaw man told me a story’… It is also used to refer 
to the language itself”: Trudy Sable and Bernie Francis, The Language of This Land, Mi’kma’ki 
(Sydney, NS: Cape Breton University Press, 2012) at 16.  
60 Marshall; Bernard, supra note 12 at para 3. 
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Courts of Appeal set aside the convictions, with an order for a new trial in Marshall 
and an acquittal in Bernard.61 
The contrasting holdings at the trial and appellate courts in Marshall and 
Bernard were a function of the application of different legal standards for 
determining the sufficiency of occupation required to prove title and, correlatively, 
differing views about whether title should apply on a territorial or site-specific basis. 
As McLachlin CJC stated in the Supreme Court’s decision in Marshall; Bernard: 
“The question before us is which of these standards of occupation is appropriate to 
determine aboriginal title: the strict standard applied by the trial judges; the looser 
standard applied by the Courts of Appeal; or some other standard?” 62  The 
distinctions at issue in the Marshall and Bernard decisions, then, were identical to 
those which separated the courts in the Tsilhqot’in litigation.  
The trial judges in both Marshall and Bernard applied a site-
specific/intensive use standard, requiring evidence of regular use of each specific site 
over which title was claimed. As Daigle JA of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal 
said of the trial judge in Bernard, “[i]n finding (para. 107) that he could not conclude 
that the land at the locus in quo (Sevogle area) was used on a regular basis, the trial 
judge was fixated on requiring evidence of actual physical use of the locus of the 
alleged offence.”63 The Courts of Appeal in both Nova Scotia and New Brunswick 
rejected the site-specific/intensive use standard. At the New Brunswick Court of 
Appeal, Daigle JA concluded that, in applying a site-specific/intensive use standard, 
the trial judge erred in law when he “failed to comply with the principles set out in 
Delgamuukw”64 and “when his central concern became the proof of specific acts of 
occupation and regular use.”65 Daigle JA articulated the distinction between the site-
specific and territorial approaches clearly, stating that: 
… the criteria for occupation and the common law analysis … stand for 
the proposition that the common law concept of occupation requires proof 
of a “definite tract of land” (i.e. the Northwest Miramichi watershed) over 
which the Mi’kmaq “habitually and exclusively ranged”. To constitute 
occupation, a specific confined area within the claimed territory need not 
be “in actual use by them at any given moment”. Moreover, the aboriginal 
perspective on the occupation of and association with their lands must be 
taken into account. On that basis, the hunting grounds of a hunting and 
gathering aboriginal community, considering their habits and modes of life 
and the resulting occupation pattern of their lands, would be as much in 
                                                
61 Ibid at para 4. 
62 Ibid at para 44.  
63 R v Bernard, 2003 NBCA 55 at para 91 (Daigle JA), 262 NBR (2d) 1 (CanLII) [Bernard (NBCA)]. The 
numbering of the paragraphs in this decision restart at the beginning of the reasons for decision 
provided by each judge. To avoid confusion, I note the name of the judge in parentheses rather than 
attempting to re-number the paragraphs. 
64 Ibid at para 115 (Daigle JA). 
65 Ibid at para 118 (Daigle JA); see also paras 123, 124, and 127 (Daigle JA). 
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their actual possession and use as their permanent settlements. The 
common law does not require proof of intensive, regular or physical use of 
every narrowly confined area within a claimed territory to constitute 
occupation of that territory.66  
The same was articulated at the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal by Cromwell JA (as he 
then was). Cromwell JA framed the question, not as “whether exclusive occupation 
of the cutting sites was established,” but as “whether exclusive occupation of a 
reasonably defined territory which includes the cutting sites, was established.”67 The 
proper standard by which title claims must be assessed looks to the exclusive 
occupation of territory. As Cromwell JA stated: 
… the courts below erred in requiring proof of regular, intensive use of the 
cutting sites to establish aboriginal title. In my opinion, this standard of 
occupation misapplies the common law perspective, fails to give equal 
weight to the aboriginal perspective, and does not take into account the 
nature of the land under consideration.68 
For the Courts of Appeal, the application of the site-specific standard amounted to an 
error of law.69  
The Supreme Court in Tsilhqot’in explicitly adopted Cromwell JA’s 
reasoning in Marshall.70 In Tsilhqot’in, the Supreme Court dismissed the application 
of the site-specific standard by the British Columbia Court of Appeal, stating that 
“[t]he alleged failure to identify particular areas with precision likewise only makes 
sense if one assumes a narrow test of intensive occupation.”71 The evident symmetry 
between the Supreme Court’s Tsilhqot’in decision and the decisions of the New 
Brunswick and Nova Scotia Courts of Appeal in the Bernard and Marshall 
decisions, respectively, raises questions about the precedential value of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Marshall; Bernard. Though Marshall; Bernard would be directly 
on point to an Aboriginal title claim in New Brunswick or Nova Scotia, following 
Tsilhqot’in there is good reason to suspect that a future title claim may produce a 
different result, one more in line with the decisions of the Courts of Appeal in 
Marshall and Bernard. 
While there is not space here to review the ambiguities of the Marshall; 
Bernard decision in detail, a close reading of the case reveals instances where 
McLachlin CJC embraced a broad definition of ‘occupation’ as including more than 
                                                
66 Ibid at para 90 (Daigle JA); Delgamuukw, supra note 11 at para 149. 
67 Marshall (NSCA), supra note 28 at para 183 [emphasis added]. 
68 Ibid at para 182. 
69 According to Cromwell JA, the trial judge “erred in law by requiring the appellants to prove intensive, 
regular use of the cutting sites”: ibid at para 183. 
70 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 2 at para 39. 
71 Ibid at para 60. 
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only intensively used sites, 72  instances where the proper standard was left 
ambiguous,73 and others still where occupation was tied to the physical occupation of 
particular sites as in a site-specific approach. 74  In respect of the latter, most 
indicative was McLachlin CJC’s statement that:  
The trial judge in each case applied the correct test to determine whether 
the respondents’ claim to aboriginal title was established. In each case 
they required proof of sufficiently regular and exclusive use of the cutting 
sites by Mi’kmaq people at the time of assertion of sovereignty.75  
Here, McLachlin CJC stated, contrary to the findings of the Courts of Appeal, that 
the trial courts applied the correct legal standard in emphasizing the use of the 
cutting sites themselves. It is difficult to see how this differs, if at all, from the site-
specific standard rejected by the Supreme Court in Tsilhqot’in. This concern was 
expressed by LeBel J in his concurring opinion in Marshall; Bernard when he wrote 
that the majority’s approach was “too narrowly focused on common law concepts 
relating to property interests.”76  
In sum, in the period following Delgamuukw, two clearly defined standards 
of occupancy came to be applied in Aboriginal title cases. One, applied by the New 
Brunswick Court of Queen’s Bench in Bernard and the Nova Scotia Provincial Court 
in Marshall, was a site-specific standard that would, by dint of the requirement of 
regular and intensive use, necessarily confine title to small, specific sites. The other, 
applied by the Courts of Appeal in Bernard and Marshall, was a territorial standard 
that would, by its grounding primarily in the exclusivity rather than the intensity of 
use, result in the possibility of findings of title over broad territories.  
The choice of which standard of occupancy to use has an impact on the 
types of evidence required to establish title. To satisfy the site-specific standard, a 
party must bring evidence of regular and intensive use of a particular site. On the 
territorial standard, by contrast, evidence should demonstrate that “the group 
exercised effective control” over the territory in question. 77  In terms of 
demonstrating effective control, there must be an emphasis on the role of Indigenous 
legal and political traditions as evidencing exclusive occupation. As Professor 
McNeil stated:  
In future cases … I think it will be important for Aboriginal title claimants 
to present strong evidence of the existence and application of Aboriginal 
law in relation to land, in addition to evidence of physical occupation, 
                                                
72 Marshall; Bernard, supra note 12 at paras 64–66.  
73 Ibid at para 70. 
74 Ibid at para 76.  
75 Ibid at para 72. 
76 Ibid at para 110. 
77 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 2 at para 50.  
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particularly where they are asserting title over their traditional territory 
rather than over specific sites.78 
In respect of the question that animates this section—that is, whether title existed in 
the Maritime Provinces—four conclusions become clear. First, new litigation should 
be tried on the standard laid out in Tsilhqot’in, which would apply an analysis much 
closer to that found in the decisions from the New Brunswick and Nova Scotia 
Courts of Appeal in Bernard and Marshall than that applied by the Supreme Court in 
Marshall; Bernard. Second, even on the more restrictive site-specific standard, it is 
very likely that title could be proven to specific sites. At the Nova Scotia Provincial 
Court in Marshall, for example, the trial judge stated that “the Mi’kmaq of the 18th 
century on mainland Nova Scotia probably had aboriginal title to lands around their 
local communities, but not to the cutting sites.”79 Third, there is good reason to 
believe that a stronger evidentiary case could be made for title in the region. As 
Lebel J noted in his concurring opinion in Marshall; Bernard, the inability of the 
Mi’kmaq to prove title was, in his view, largely due to an insufficient evidentiary 
record.80 In particular, more evidence of the Mi’kmaq legal and political framework, 
insofar as it could demonstrate exclusive control of the territory, should have been 
brought. Fourth, Marshall; Bernard should not be taken to foreclose a future finding 
of title in favour of the Nova Scotia or Miramichi Mi’kmaq, a view that was stated 
explicitly by Lebel J  in his concurring opinion.81  
These conclusions are reinforced by the historical record. Though it is 
beyond the scope of this paper to thoroughly engage the historical record pertaining 
to proof of title, it is worth briefly reviewing some of the salient evidence that 
demonstrates the likelihood that title could be proved on the basis of the standard 
articulated in Tsilhqot’in. Again, this analysis is not meant to make claims as to the 
precise geographic areas where title may be demonstrated to have existed. Rather, it 
is meant only to demonstrate the high probability that title could be proven to have 
existed in the region. 
B. Historical Occupation 
Aboriginal title is established with reference to Indigenous occupation of the territory 
in question at the date of the British assertion of sovereignty. That date was 
determined by the courts to be 1713 for mainland Nova Scotia, 1759 for New 
Brunswick, and 1763 for Cape Breton and Prince Edward Island.82 Assessing the 
                                                
78 Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and the Supreme Court: What’s Happening?” (2006) 69:2 Sask L Rev 
281 at 308 (QL). 
79 R v Marshall, 2001 NSPC 2 at para 143, 191 NSR (2d) 323 (CanLII) [Marshall (NSPC)].  
80 Marshall; Bernard, supra note 12 at paras 141–142.  
81 Ibid at para 141. 
82 See Marshall (NSPC), supra note 79 at para 28; Bernard (NBCA), supra note 63 at para 171 (Daigle 
JA). I have accepted these dates here, though that should not be taken as an indication that I consider 
them settled or correct. Given the importance of the date of sovereignty for determining title, it is an 
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existence of Aboriginal title in the Maritime Provinces, then, requires assessing 
whether the Aboriginal peoples of the region exclusively occupied given territories 
to the extent required to establish title at those dates. Again, it is clear following 
Tsilhqot’in that title claims will be assessed on a territorial/exclusive occupation 
standard, meaning that title may be proven to broad tracts of land and that each 
particular site within that territory need not have been intensively used.  
That the Mi’kmaq, Wuastukwiuk (Maliseet), and Passamaquoddy 
physically occupied many sites in the Maritime Provinces at sovereignty is beyond 
question. As Curran J noted at the Nova Scotia Provincial Court: 
When the British acquired sovereignty in 1713, the only people living in 
most of mainland Nova Scotia were Mi’kmaq. The Mi’kmaq had lived in 
Nova Scotia since centuries before Europeans arrived. There is no reason 
to believe any other aboriginal group lived here during that time or later. 
There were about 2,500 Acadians in the province, but most of them lived 
in a few concentrated areas along the Bay of Fundy. Besides that, there 
was just a small British garrison at Annapolis.83  
Though Curran J stated that there were almost certainly “substantial tracts of land 
unclaimed and largely unused between the communities,”84 he also observed that 
“[t]he Mi’kmaq communities were not isolated from each other, particularly in the 
summer. They spoke a common language with little variation in dialect throughout 
Nova Scotia and beyond. They could and did travel the length and breadth of the 
mainland using the many interconnected waterways.”85 He concluded that “[t]here is 
no doubt the Mi’kmaq moved at will throughout mainland Nova Scotia in 1713, 
                                                                                                               
issue that should be examined closely. For problems identifying the date of sovereignty, see Margaret 
McCallum “After Bernard and Marshall” (2006) 55 UNB LJ 73 at 75 note 7: “Historians may puzzle 
over the difference between the date of acquisition of sovereignty in New Brunswick and in Cape 
Breton, especially as the trial judge in Marshall concluded that Britain ‘probably acquired sovereignty 
over Cape Breton’ in 1758.”  
83 Marshall (NSPC), supra note 79 at para 126.  
84 Ibid at para 131. 
85 Ibid at para 129. It is useful to compare Curran J’s comments to Vickers J’s description of Tsilhqot’in 
occupation at the trial level in Tsilhqot’in Nation:  
At the time of sovereignty assertion, Tsilhqot’in people living in the Claim Area were semi-
nomadic. They moved up and down the main salmon bearing river, the Tsilhqox (Chilko 
River), in season. They fished the smaller lakes to the east and west of the Tsilhqox, 
particularly in the spring season. They gathered berries, medicines and root plants in the 
valleys and on the slopes of the surrounding mountains. They hunted and trapped across the 
Claim Area, taking what nature had to offer. Then, for the most part, they returned on a 
regular basis to winter at Xeni (Nemiah Valley), on the eastern shore of Tsilhqox Biny 
(Chilko Lake), on the high ground above the banks of the Tsilhqox, and on the shores of 
adjacent streams and lakes, from Naghatalhchoz Biny (Big Eagle Lake) and eastward into 
Tachelachíed. 
 Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2007 BCSC 1700 at para 953, [2007] BCJ No 2465 (QL) 
(CanLII) [Tsilhqot’in Trial]. 
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except perhaps in the Acadian areas and at Annapolis.”86 In respect of the Mi’kmaq 
in New Brunswick, Daigle JA found “that by 1759 there had been no displacement 
by Europeans of the Mi’kmaq occupation of their traditional territory,”87 that “no 
other aboriginal groups or Europeans challenged the exclusive use and occupation of 
the Northwest Miramichi watershed by the Mi’kmaq between contact in 1500 and 
British sovereignty in 1759,” 88  and “that the Mi’kmaq were peaceably and 
exclusively occupying the Northwest Miramichi watershed.”89  
Curran J similarly found that there had been little displacement of the 
Mi’kmaq on Cape Breton, stating that “the only European settlement of any 
consequence other than Louisbourg was a small French community at Port Toulouse 
(St. Peters).”90 This led him to the extremely important factual conclusion that:  
[t]he question of exclusiveness really does not arise in this case. There was 
no other aboriginal group in Nova Scotia in 1713 or 1763. On the 
mainland in 1713 there were a few Acadian enclaves and one small British 
outpost. In Cape Breton between the fall of Louisbourg and 1763 there 
was one small French community and some scattered French settlers. 
There is no reason to believe there was any European on any of the cutting 
sites, or for that matter on most of the mainland or in most of Cape Breton, 
at the relevant times. That leaves the question of occupancy.91  
Given that this factual finding was not disturbed by a higher court, and recalling how 
the tests for sufficiency and exclusivity emphasize the exclusive occupation and 
control of territory, this is an extremely important finding.  
The Mi’kmaq were also present on pre-sovereignty Prince Edward Island, 
which was unquestionably an important part of their traditional territory.92 While the 
Mi’kmaq undoubtedly occupied the island before European arrival, the extent of 
their occupation at the time of the British assertion of sovereignty is more difficult to 
peg with precision. After the fall of Louisbourg on 26 July 1758, the British decided 
to evacuate the Acadians and Mi’kmaq from Prince Edward Island, though about 200 
                                                
86 Marshall (NSPC), supra note 79 at para 131. 
87 Bernard (NBCA), supra note 63 at para 171 (Daigle JA).  
88 Ibid.  
89 Ibid at para 148 (Daigle JA).  
90 Marshall (NSPC), supra note 79 at para 132.  
91 Ibid at para 137. In 1703 there were 1,324 Acadians on mainland Nova Scotia: William C Wicken, 
Mi’kmaq Treaties on Trial: History, Land, and Donald Marshall Junior (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2002) at 103 [Wicken, Mi’kmaq Treaties]. 
92 Rusty Bitterman, “Mi’kmaq Land Claims and the Escheat Movement in Prince Edward Island” (2006) 
55 UNB LJ 172 at 173 [Bitterman, “Escheat Movement”]; LFS Upton, Micmacs and Colonists: Indian-
White Relations in the Maritimes, 1713-1867 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1979) 
at 113 [Upton, Indian-White Relations]; Margaret McCallum, “Problems in Determining the Date of 
Reception in Prince Edward Island” (2006) 55 UNB LJ 3 at 3 [McCallum, “Date of Reception in PEI”]. 
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of each remained on the island.93 As of the 1830s there were about 500 Mi’kmaq on 
the island.94 An 1838 petition from Oliver Thomas LeBone, Chief of the Prince 
Edward Island Mi’kmaq, stated that “they were but ‘a skeleton’ of ‘our once 
numerous tribe.’”95 Prior to the British acquisition of sovereignty, however, there 
was a French presence on the island, with many Acadians being expelled from the 
island following the fall of Louisbourg.96 
There is also unequivocal historical evidence of Wuastukwiuk occupation in 
the region, particularly in the Saint John River Valley. Indeed, the British referred to 
them as the ‘St. John River Indians’, and ‘Wuastukwiuk’ itself means ‘people of the 
Wulastuk (Saint John) River’.97 The Wuastukwiuk travelled the length of the river, 
camping along its shores in the summer and travelling into the forests in the winter to 
hunt.98 As historian W.O. Raymond wrote of the Wuastukwiuk:  
The dark recesses of the forest, the sunny glades of the open woodland, 
the mossy dells, the sparkling streams and roaring mountain torrents, the 
quiet lakes, the noble [Saint John] river flowing onward to the sea with 
islands here and there embosomed by its tide—all were his. The smoke of 
his wigwam fire curled peacefully from Indian village and temporary 
encampment. He might wander where he pleased with none to say him 
nay.99 
While such a statement lacks the specificity required to ground a claim for 
Aboriginal title, it nonetheless provides a clear view of the understanding of pre-
sovereignty Wuastukwiuk occupation of the Saint John River region from the eyes of 
an historian at the turn of the 20th century. 
One of the principal Wuastukwiuk sites on the river was at Medoctec, just 
south of present-day Woodstock.100 Medoctic was well beyond the reach of English 
settlement until well after the arrival of the Loyalists in 1784–1785 and was an 
                                                
93 McCallum, “Date of Reception in PEI”, supra note 92 at 4. 
94 Bitterman, “Escheat Movement”, supra note 92 at 173.  
95 Ibid. 
96 By 1742 there were 2,180 Acadians on Prince Edward Island (Île Royal); by 1758, only about 200: 
Wicken, Mi’kmaq Treaties, supra note 91 at 103; Bitterman, “Escheat Movement”, supra note 92 at 
173.  
97 Wicken, Mi’kmaq Treaties, supra note 91 at 29. 
98 Alan D McMillan, Native Peoples and Cultures of Canada: An Anthropological Overview, 2d ed 
(Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1995) at 49–55. 
99 WO Raymond, Glimpses of the Past History of the River St John, AD 1604-1784 (St John, NB, 1905) at 
5. 
100 This site is not to be confused with present-day Meductic, which is further south of the traditional site. 
See DG Bell, “A Commercial Harvesting Prosecution in Context: The Peter Paul Case, 1946” (2006) 55 
UNB LJ 86. 
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important portage site linking Wuastukwiuk territory to their Abenaki neighbours.101 
There are many reports from early explorers detailing the Wuastukwiuk presence, 
archeological sites running the length of the Saint John River and its tributaries, and 
many early maps representing Wuastukwiuk villages from Fredericton to 
Madawaska.102 In sum, there is little doubt that the Wuastukwiuk occupied the Saint 
John River Valley at the date of the assertion of sovereignty.  
Occupation can also be demonstrated for the purpose of establishing title 
with reference to prevailing Aboriginal conceptions of territoriality, as evidenced in 
part by their distinct legal and political orders.103 In this light, it is notable that 
Curran J stated:  
The Mi’kmaq had, as Dr. von Gernet put it, “a sense of territoriality.” That 
was clear from everything they said to the British from 1713 to 1760 and 
beyond well into the 19th century. They made it clear they considered all 
of Nova Scotia their land, their territory. They repeatedly accused the 
British of taking their land without permission.104  
It is clear that the Mi’kmaq considered themselves to have the capacity to exclude 
others and to do so pursuant to their own internal legal regimes.105 As Professor 
                                                
101  Ibid at 87. This system of waterways was said to have been “used by the Indians from time 
immemorial”: George Frederick Clarke, Six Salmon Rivers and Another (Fredericton, NB: Brunswick 
Press, 1960) at 92. 
102 Tom FS McFeat, “Two Malecite Family Industries: A Case Study” (1962) 4:2 Anthropologica 233 at 
236.  
103 In the trial decision in Tsilhqot’in, Vickers J spent considerable time recounting the Tsilhqot’in stories 
that were given as evidence at trial: Tsilhqot’in Trial, supra note 85 at paras 146–148. For an analysis of 
Mi’kmaw legal principles as applied to contemporary jurisprudence, see Jamie Battiste, “Understanding 
the Progression of Mi’kmaw Law” (2008) 31:2 Dal LJ 311 at 325 (QL): 
The creation story of the Mi’kmaw establishes the relations between the Mi’kmaq and their 
ecology; it also generates Mi’kmaw knowledge and legal traditions behind their aboriginal 
and treaty rights. Mi’kmaq knowledge is at the root of the oral tradition and ceremonies and 
in the teachings, stories, and performances that are passed down from generation to 
generation. 
 See also James [sákéj] Youngblood Henderson, “First Nations Legal Inheritances in Canada: The 
Míkmaq Model” (1995) 23 Man LJ 1 (QL) [Henderson, “Legal Inheritances”]. For Mi’kmaw stories see 
Rita Joe & Lesley Choyce, The Mi’kmaq Anthology (Lawrencetown Beach, NS: Pottersfield Press, 
1997); Alden Nowlan, Nine Micmac Legends (Hantsport, NS: Lancelot Press, 1983); Ruth Holmes 
Whitehead, The Old Man Told Us: Excerpts from Micmac History 1500-1950 (Halifax: Nimbus 
Publishing, 1991). 
104 Marshall (NSPC), supra note 79 at para 135. Of crucial importance, British officials at the date of 
sovereignty were “aware that the Mi’kmaq claimed a right to the land”: Wicken, Mi’kmaq Treaties, 
supra note 91 at 122.  
105  The Maliseet also believed they had the right to exclude others from their territory, as evidenced by 
their warning to the British to leave the Saint John River Valley in 1778. The Maliseet spokesman 
stated:  
…the King of England with his Evil Councilors has been Trying to Take away the Lands & 
Liberties of our Country… Now, as the King of England has no business, nor ever had any, 
on this River, we Desire you to go away with your men in Peace, & Take all those Men who 
76 UNBLJ     RD UN-B [VOL/TOME 67 
 
William Wicken, an expert witness in the both the Marshall and Bernard cases and a 
number of other cases involving Aboriginal peoples in the Maritime region, stated on 
the stand in Bernard: 
[T]here was a protocol, there was a relationship, a customary relationship 
that evolved over time between these people and which governed their 
relationships. If somebody come [sic] on to your territory then in fact there 
was a law, if I can use that word, aboriginal law, their law, about how this 
infringement upon their territory would be dealt with.106  
This legal regime pre-dated the arrival of Europeans. Professor Sákéj Henderson, 
commenting on the views expressed by early Europeans in the region, stated:   
Neither European adventurers nor missionary priests of the seventeenth 
century who encountered the sacred order of the Míkmaq (Míkmaki) 
perceived an unorganised society. They did not find the anarchy that their 
state of nature theory presumed. Instead, they reported a natural order, 
with a well-defined system of consensual government and both an 
international and domestic law.107   
In other words, at the date of sovereignty, there was a clearly defined territory over 
which the Mi’kmaq exercised exclusive occupation, evidenced not only by their use 
of the land, but also by the existence of complex social, political, and economic 
structures linking communities across the region. The international elements of 
Mi’kmaw law were recognized both by other Indigenous nations and by the Imperial 
European powers, evidenced, for example, by the fact that in 1719 the British 
instructed the newly commissioned governor, Richard Philipps, “to deal with the 
Mi’kmaq according to the protocols of Algonkian diplomacy.”108 The British not 
only recognized that the Mi’kmaq had existing diplomatic protocols; the British 
instructed their early governors in Nova Scotia to engage the Mi’kmaq according to 
those protocols.109 The existence of the Wabanaki Confederacy, which included 
groups inhabiting what is now the Maritime Provinces, the Gaspé Peninsula, and 
                                                                                                               
has been fighting or Talking against Amarica [sic]. If you Dont [sic] go Directly, you must 
take Care of yourself, your Men, & all your English Subjects, on this River for if any or all of 
you are Killed it is not our faults, for we give you Warning Time Anough [sic] to Escape. 
 James P Baxter, ed, Documentary History of the State of Maine (Portland, 1910) vol 16 at 74–75, 
reprinted in WD Hamilton and WA Spray, eds, Source Materials Relating to the New Brunswick Indian 
(Fredericton, NB: Hamray Books, 1977) at 50–51. 
106 Bernard (NBCA), supra note 63 at para 146 (Daigle JA) [emphasis omitted].  
107 Henderson, “Legal Inheritances”, supra note 103 at 10. See also James [sákéj] Youngblood Henderson, 
The Mikmaw Concordat (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1997) at 34. 
108  Geoffrey Plank, An Unsettled Conquest: The British Campaign Against the Peoples of Acadia 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001) at 70.  
109 Reliance on Aboriginal protocols was commonplace in the early treaty-making period: See James 
[sákéj] Youngblood Henderson, “Míkmaw Tenure in Atlantic Canada” (1995) 18:2 Dal LJ 196 at 240.  
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parts of New England, is further evidence of the pan-national scope of Indigenous 
law in the region.110  
Much more evidence could be brought to illustrate the existence of 
Indigenous legal orders at the time of the assertion of British sovereignty. Here I 
have tried only to illustrate the likelihood that occupation sufficient to ground a 
finding of title could be established and that, indeed, such occupation has already 
been established as a finding of fact by trial courts in both Nova Scotia and New 
Brunswick. This is not to say that occupation sufficient to ground a declaration of 
Aboriginal title can or will be demonstrated over the entirety of the region. As in the 
trial decision in Tsilhqot’in, evidence of presence throughout a traditional territory 
can be recognized while falling short of the evidentiary requirements required to 
establish title.111 Nonetheless, it seems clear that title can be proven to have existed 
over broad territories in the region where the correct legal standard is applied. 
C. Title by Treaty 
The Treaties of Peace and Friendship also provide evidence of the existence of 
Aboriginal title.112 The potential importance of treaties as evidence establishing title 
was recognized by Lamer CJC in Delgamuukw.113 It is widely accepted that the 
                                                
110 Ibid at 239. See also Harald EL Prins, The Mi’kmaq: Resistance, Accommodation, and Cultural 
Survival (Orlando: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1996) at 117–119 [Prins, Cultural Survival]. 
111 See, e.g., Tsilhqot’in Trial, supra note 85 at para 928.  
112 For a more detailed account of this argument see Hamilton, Aboriginal Title in Canada’s Maritime 
Provinces, supra note 1 at 40–49. Here I will focus only on the treaty of 1725-26. This treaty was 
renewed by later treaties in 1749, 1752, and 1760-61, with the validity of the latter two upheld by the 
Supreme Court in Simon and Marshall #1, respectively. See Simon v The Queen, [1985] 2 SCR 387 at 
398–401, 24 DLR (4th) 390 (CanLII) [Simon]; R v Marshall, [1999] 3 SCR 456, 177 DLR (4th) 513 
(CanLII) [Marshall #1 cited to SCR]. Though the Mi’kmaq, in particular, have most often relied on the 
treaties of 1752 and 1760-61 to assert their rights, all of the mid-century treaties renewed the provisions 
of the 1725-26 treaty. While a thorough analysis of treaty rights in the region would require an analysis 
of each treaty, the 1725-26 treaty contains the most explicit provisions regarding land. This treaty is 
sometimes referred to as the ‘Treaty of 1725’: R v Sappier; R v Gray, [2006] 2 SCR 686 at para 62, 309 
NBR (2d) 199 (CanLII) [Sappier; Gray]. The treaty in question was negotiated in November and 
December of 1725 and ratified by individual communities in 1726. I have followed Professor Wicken 
(in Mi’kmaq Treaties, supra note 91) in referring to the treaty as the ‘1726 treaty’, relying on the dates 
of ratification, though I take no issue with the use of 1725. Much of the confusion about the 1726 treaty 
results from a lack of clarity regarding the distinction between ‘Dummer’s Treaty’ and ‘Mascarene’s 
Treaty’. Put simply, the treaties were negotiated at the same time, with one applying to the Abenaki of 
New England and the other to the Mi’kmaq, Maliseet and Passamaquoddy. For a full account of the 
distinction, see Andrea Bear Nicholas, “Mascarene’s Treaty of 1725” (1994) 43 UNB LJ 3. The validity 
of the treaty and its applicability to the Maliseet was conceded by the Crown in Sappier; Gray and the 
Crown was estopped from arguing against the validity of the treaty of 1725-26 on the basis of issue 
estoppel in R v Paul, 2014 NBPC 44 at paras 15–20 (CanLII). 
113  In Degamuukw, the Supreme Court held that treaties may assist in determining the Aboriginal 
perspective in title claims. Lamer CJC stated that  
…aboriginal laws under which permission may be granted to other aboriginal groups to use 
or reside even temporarily on land would reinforce the finding of exclusive occupation. 
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Treaties of Peace and Friendship did not cede Aboriginal title in the Maritime 
Provinces to the Crown.114 It is often thought that this is the case because the treaties 
allegedly said nothing about land.115 This is, however, an oversimplification: The 
1726 treaty did, in fact, deal with the future settlement of land in the region.  
A reading of the text of the 1726 treaty and an examination of the historical 
context in which it was signed demonstrate that the treaty recognizes the existence of 
title. Two clauses are of particular importance. First, Clause 3 of the Articles of 
Peace and Agreement contained in the 1726 treaty states that “the Indians shall not 
molest any of His Majesty’s Subjects or their Dependants in their Settlements 
already made or Lawfully to be made.” 116  Under this clause, the Indigenous 
signatories agree not to molest any British settlements that have already been made 
or, crucially, those that are lawfully constructed after the signing of the treaty. The 
treaty clearly contemplated that a lawful procedure existed which governed any 
British settlement subsequent to the treaty. The first important point about this is that 
there was virtually no British settlement at the time the 1726 treaty was signed, the 
only permanent occupation being the fort at Annapolis. All British settlement 
subsequent to 1726—that is, all settlement outside the fort at Annapolis—was bound 
to occur “lawfully.” Unfortunately, the term ‘lawfully’ is not defined in the treaty 
itself. Nonetheless, a look at the historical context in which the treaty was signed 
provides insight into how the signatories would have understood the term.  
In the 17th and 18th centuries, the British policy was to purchase or 
otherwise acquire the Aboriginal interest in land before settlement.117 There are 
many reasons to believe this policy was in the contemplation of the signatories to the 
                                                                                                               
Indeed, if that permission were the subject of treaties between the aboriginal nations in 
question, those treaties would also form part of the aboriginal perspective. 
 Delgamuukw, supra note 11 at para 127. Though Lamer CJC’s comment focuses on treaties between 
Aboriginal nations, there is no reason the same logic cannot apply to treaties between Aboriginal and 
European nations. Such treaties were likely not in Lamer CJC’s contemplation because the majority of 
such treaties were signed after confederation and were concerned with the cession of land, neither of 
which is the case in the Maritime Provinces.  
114 Simon, supra note 112 at 410. At the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, Cromwell JA noted that “the 
Supreme Court of Canada on two occasions has expressed the view that the 1760 - 61 treaties do not 
cede land”: Marshall (NSCA), supra note 28 at para 98 [emphasis in original]. See also R v Isaac 
(1975), 13 NSR (2d) 460 at 479, 9 APR 460 (CA) (WLNext Can) [Isaac (NSCA)]. The Department of 
Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development website recognizes that “[u]nlike later treaties signed in 
other parts of Canada, the Peace and Friendship Treaties did not involve First Nations surrendering 
rights to the lands and resources they had traditionally used and occupied”: Department of Aboriginal 
Affairs and Northern Development Canada, “Peace and Friendship Treaties”, online: 
<https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100028589/1100100028591#a3>. 
115  DG Bell, “Was Amerindian Dispossession Lawful? The Response of 19th-Century Maritime 
Intellectuals” (2000) 23:1 Dal LJ 168 at 174 (QL) [Bell, “Amerindian Dispossession].  
116 Lisa Patterson, ed, The Mi’kmaq Treaty Handbook (Sydney, NS: Native Communications Society of 
Nova Scotia, 1987) at 19–20 [Patterson, Mi’kmaq Treaty Handbook].  
117 Stuart Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 2005) at 22–28; Wicken, Mi’kmaq Treaties, supra note 91 at 113, 139; 
Dickason, Canada’s First Nations, supra note 40 at 107–108. 
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1726 treaty. It is important to recall that Aboriginal peoples came to the treaty table 
with considerable experience in treaty-making and diplomatic relations, both with 
other Indigenous nations and with Europeans. The early Abenaki treaties with the 
British, then, provide insight into how the Mi’kmaq and Wuastukwiuk would have 
conceived of treaties with the British. The Abenaki signed four treaties with the 
British between 1678 and 1713.118 Other members of the Wabanaki Confederacy 
would have been aware of these treaties, the circumstances that gave rise to them, 
and the solutions sought through treaty negotiations. These treaties were explicitly 
concerned with British settlement. Clause 3 of the Articles of Peace and Agreement 
of the 1726 treaty, which prohibited unlawful future settlements, was influenced by 
the earlier Abenaki treaties.119 Central to the Abenaki treaties was the agreement that 
any future British settlement would require Indigenous permission and that 
compensation would be required for any lands to be ceded for the purposes of 
settlement.120  The war of 1722–1725 between the British and members of the 
Wabanaki Confederacy was a direct result of British incursions onto Abenaki lands; 
as Professor Wicken stated, “the war was about land.”121 The 1726 treaty, then, was 
the product of long-standing disputes over British settlement. 
This returns us to the interpretation of the phrase ‘lawfully to be made’, 
which it seems should be interpreted as meaning ‘having been purchased or 
otherwise ceded’. Though the British insisted that previous purchases be recognized 
and that they had jurisdiction over the entirety of the land in the colonies in question, 
they accepted the need to purchase lands or otherwise obtain Aboriginal consent 
before settling them. Thus, Massachusetts negotiators at the treaty conference in 
1725 told the Abenaki: “When we come to Settle the Bounds We shall neither build 
or settle any where but within our own Bounds so settled, without your Consent;” 
they further promised that “you will certainly be paid for such Lands as you shall 
hereafter dispose of to the English.”122 It is evident from the foregoing that the 
British signatories to the 1726 treaty understood the Indigenous signatories to have 
some form of ownership over or right to the territory they occupied; it would be 
inconsistent to hold as a policy the need to purchase or obtain a surrender of land 
absent the belief that the other party had some form of ownership interest. Put 
otherwise, it amounts to a recognition that the Indigenous peoples had the “intention 
and capacity to control the land” required by the ‘sufficiency’ and ‘exclusivity’ 
elements of the Delgamuukw test. 
                                                
118 John G Reid, Essays On Northeastern North America: Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2008) at 155. Professor Wicken argues that “the experience of the Abenaki 
would have been central to how Mi’kmaq leaders understood British policies”: Wicken, Mi’kmaq 
Treaties, supra note 91 at 128. 
119 Wicken, supra note 91 at 118-128.  
120 The war of 1722–1725 was a result of “the British intent to enclose lands and Abenaki attempts to mark 
the limits of English settlement”: Wicken, Mi’kmaq Treaties, supra note 91 at 74. 
121 Ibid at 87.  
122 Ibid at 128. 
80 UNBLJ     RD UN-B [VOL/TOME 67 
 
The view that the treaties recognize and protect an Aboriginal interest in 
land was expressed by Turnbull J at the New Brunswick Court of Queen’s Bench in 
the Peter Paul decision.123 There, Mr. Peter Paul asserted a treaty right to harvest 
timber in response to a charge of illegally removing timber from Crown land. In 
dismissing the charges against Mr. Peter Paul, Turnbull J stated: 
I am of the opinion that the Indians of New Brunswick do have land rights 
and that such are treaty rights. I believe it is like a usufructuary right. It 
does not matter what such rights are called. It is not a right restricted to 
personal use, but a full blown right of beneficial ownership and possession 
in keeping with the concept of this is our land - that is your land.124 
On this interpretation, the 1726 treaty clearly distinguished between Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous lands and was designed to protect the Indigenous interest in those 
lands. As Turnbull J held, “[g]overnments must accept that Dummer’s Treaty was 
understood to protect Indian land.”125 The 1726 treaty did not, on this view, reflect 
“a recognition by the Indians that the Crown held a complete title to the soil, to the 
exclusion of aboriginal title.”126 Turnbull J held that the terms ‘molested’ and 
‘lawfully to be made’, as used in the treaty, could not have had the effect of 
extinguishing title, holding that “there was ‘sharp practice’ if this is the wording 
whereby the Micmac and particularly the St. Johns and Passamaquoddy Indians lost 
their lands” and that “[t]o say the English Monarch could make fee simple Crown 
grants ignoring Indians’ land rights on the basis of these words is wrong.”127 
The New Brunswick Court of Appeal, however, overturned Turnbull J’s 
findings, holding that the 1726 treaty “does not create or acknowledge an aboriginal 
title to land. Indeed, by it, Mr. Peter Paul’s ancestors acknowledge not only the 
Crown’s jurisdiction and dominion over the lands, but also the Crown’s title and 
rightful possession to the lands.”128 Though much more could be said about this 
decision, two points will serve to illustrate its dubious precedential value. First, while 
the Court of Appeal did explicitly overturn Turnbull J on the question of a treaty-
protected right to land, the principal issues on which the decision was overturned 
were that Turnbull J had taken judicial notice of disputed historical facts well beyond 
the permissible scope of such notice, had decided a matter that had not been argued 
before the Court, had relied on his own external research rather than the evidence put 
properly before the Court, and had decided points of law on which neither party to 
                                                
123 R v Peter Paul (1997), 193 NBR (2d) 321, 1997 CarswellNB 392 (QB) (WLNext Can) [Peter Paul 
(NBQB)]. 
124 Ibid at para 69. 
125 Ibid at para 71. 
126 Brian Slattery, “Some Thoughts on Aboriginal Title” (1999) 48 UNB LJ 19 at 36 [Slattery, “Some 
Thoughts”]. 
127 Peter Paul (NBQB), supra note 123 at para 46. 
128 R v Peter Paul (1998), 196 NBR (2d) 292, 1998 CarswellNB 117 at para 27 (CA) (WLNext Can). 
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the case had been given the opportunity to make representations to the Court.129 Put 
simply, the trial decision was overturned primarily on procedural and technical 
grounds. Such issues would likely not arise in most cases.  
Second, the Court of Appeal’s specific findings on Aboriginal title itself are 
also of questionable precedential value. The Court of Appeal held that, in the treaty 
promises of 1726, the Indigenous signatories “acknowledge not only the Crown’s 
jurisdiction and dominion over the lands, but also the Crown’s title and rightful 
possession to the lands.”130 As Brian Slattery has remarked, however, “this inference 
seems to ignore a number of fundamental considerations.”131 Slattery has pointed out 
two relevant problems with the Court of Appeal’s decision. First, the decision 
overlooks the fundamental distinction between sovereignty and property rights. In 
overlooking this distinction, the Court also overlooked the well established doctrine 
of continuity, which recognized that, where there was a change in sovereignty, “the 
existing property rights of the local inhabitants presumptively survive the change of 
sovereignty and are recognizable in the courts established by the new sovereign.”132 
Second, the Court wrongly assumed that the terms ‘just titles’ and ‘Jurisdiction and 
Dominion’ dealt with Indigenous land rights or gave the Crown property rights 
unburdened by existing Aboriginal title. 133  Beyond these two problems, it is 
important to note that, although the Court of Appeal upbraided Turnbull J for 
deciding an issue that was not argued before the Court (and thus on a wanting 
evidentiary record), the Court of Appeal then relied on that same record to make 
extremely important findings regarding title in the region. Thus, while the Court of 
Appeal’s ruling in respect of the procedural concerns surrounding Turnbull J’s 
decision was justified, its conclusions regarding Aboriginal title, with respect, were 
not.  
The question of a treaty-protected right to land, therefore, must be assessed 
on the basis of a complete and properly pleaded evidentiary record. As outlined 
above, there is good cause to believe that such a right may be demonstrated under 
those circumstances. Put otherwise, Aboriginal title may be protected by treaty in the 
region. Equally important, however, is the less ambitious claim that title is 
recognized in the 1726 treaty. The view that the 1726 treaty recognizes Aboriginal 
title stops short of arguing that the treaty protects title, arguing only that the parties 
to the treaty clearly understood the Indigenous signatories to have the intention and 
capacity to occupy and control their territories and that such an understanding should 
form an important part of an evidentiary record demonstrating the existence of title at 
the time of the assertion of British sovereignty.  
                                                
129 Ibid at paras 13–24.  
130 Ibid at para 27. 
131 Slattery, “Some Thoughts”, supra note 126 at 38. 
132 Ibid at 39. 
133 Ibid. 
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This interpretation is supported by the Supreme Court’s holdings on treaty 
interpretation. In interpreting a treaty between the Crown and Indigenous peoples, 
courts “must take into account the historical context and perception each party might 
have as to the nature of the undertaking contained in the document under 
consideration.” 134  In interpreting the historical context of the treaty and the 
perceptions of the signatories, courts are required to give the treaty a “just, broad and 
liberal construction”135 and resolve ambiguities and uncertainties “in favour of the 
Indians.” 136  The liberal approach to treaty interpretation is grounded in the 
presumption that the Crown negotiated treaties honourably, such that a flexible 
interpretation must be applied, including the use “of context and implied terms to 
make honourable sense of the treaty arrangement” and of the terms of the treaty.137 
In this context, the foregoing discussion regarding the historical background of the 
treaties and the Indigenous perspectives on their crucial clauses concerning 
settlement and land use, coupled with the Supreme Court’s clear jurisprudence on 
treaty interpretation, strongly suggests that the treaties should be interpreted as both 
recognizing and protecting the Indigenous interest in land. 
Having argued that Aboriginal title existed in the region, the two questions 
which arise are where such title existed and whether such title has been extinguished. 
As discussed, the first of these questions is beyond the purview of this paper to 
address; it will suffice for the purposes of this paper to establish that title clearly 
existed somewhere, likely to broad, contiguous tracts of land. The remainder of this 
paper will be concerned with providing an answer to the latter question: whether, 
where it can be proven to have existed, title has been extinguished.  
IV. EXTINGUISHMENT OF ABORIGINAL TITLE 
Prior to the constitutionalization of Aboriginal and treaty rights in 1982, Aboriginal 
title may have been extinguished in one of two ways: by voluntary surrender or 
unilaterally through legislation.138  Title can now be extinguished only through 
voluntary surrender, and any infringements of title must be justified pursuant to the 
standards established by the Supreme Court.139 Where Aboriginal title can be proven 
to have existed at the date of the assertion of sovereignty, extinguishment can be 
determined by ascertaining whether that title was surrendered voluntarily or, prior to 
1982, by unilateral legislation. The onus is on the party seeking to prove 
                                                
134 R v Sioui, [1990] 1 SCR 1025 at 1035, 70 DLR (4th) 427 (CanLII). 
135 Ibid at 1036. 
136 Ibid at 1035.  
137 Marshall #1, supra note 112 at para 14. 
138  R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507 at para 110, 137 DLR (4th) 289 (CanLII) [Van der Peet]; Mitchell 
v MNR, 2001 SCC 33 at paras 10–11, [2001] 1 SCR 911 (CanLII). 
139 Delgamuukw, supra note 11. The standards for justification of infringements of Aboriginal rights more 
generally were established in R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075, 70 DLR (4th) 385 (CanLII) [Sparrow 
cited to SCR].  
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extinguishment to bring evidence that title was extinguished by one of these two 
means.140 
Should pre-1982 legislation be relied on as evidence of extinguishment, the 
ability of that legislation to extinguish title is constrained by three requirements. 
First, the legislative body must have been competent to legislate in respect of both 
common law property rights and Aboriginal land rights—that is, the legislation must 
not have been ultra vires the legislative body which enacted it. Second, the 
legislation in question must not have been repugnant to higher order constitutional 
laws or principles by which the legislative body was bound (e.g., Royal 
Proclamation, 1763, 141  treaties, etc.). 142  Third, any purported legislative 
extinguishment must satisfy the “clear and plain intent” standard.143 This standard 
stipulates that the legislative body must have had the intention to extinguish the right 
in question; extinguishment could not have occurred incidentally. 
A. Voluntary Surrender  
The ability of Indigenous peoples to voluntarily enter into agreements with the 
Crown that have the effect of extinguishing title has never been questioned; rather, 
“[i]t has always been considered possible for a native people to cede aboriginal lands 
to the Crown by treaty.” 144  This policy was given legal force in the Royal 
Proclamation, which “laid down a uniform legal regime governing native title, 
whereby native groups were recognized as holding communal rights to their unceded 
lands, subject only to a restriction of alienation.”145 As Professor Slattery stated, 
pursuant to the Royal Proclamation, “aboriginal peoples held continuing rights to 
their lands except where these rights have been extinguished by voluntary 
                                                
140 Calder v British Columbia (AG), [1973] SCR 313 at 404, 34 DLR (3d) 145 (CanLII) [Calder]. 
141 RSC, 1985, App II, No 1 [Royal Proclamation or Proclamation]. 
142 Framing this as an issue of competence and repugnancy was adopted from Bruce Clark, Native Liberty, 
Crown Sovereignty: The Existing Aboriginal Right of Self-Government in Canada (Montreal & 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990) at 71 [Clark, Native Liberty]. Clark also referred to 
repugnancy in terms of the doctrine of repugnancy, which stated that colonial laws could not be 
repugnant to the laws of England. It is commonly held that repugnancy has not been an issue since the 
enactment of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865 (UK), 28 & 29 Vict, c 63, which retroactively 
validated legislation made void by way of repugnancy: see Bernard (NBCA), supra note 63 at para 177 
(Robertson JA). It is my view that the Colonial Laws Validity Act did not apply as sweepingly as 
suggested by Robertson JA, and that the Colonial Laws Validity Act could not have operated to revive a 
law which would have been ultra vires a colonial legislature, as the constitutional framework 
establishing that jurisdiction was constituted by Imperial laws about the colony, not colonial laws. The 
Royal Proclamation was held to have survived the Colonial Laws Validity Act by Hall J in Calder, 
supra note 140 at 395. 
143 Sparrow, supra note 139 at 1097. 
144 Brian Slattery, “The Hidden Constitution: Aboriginal Rights in Canada” (1984) 32:2 Am J Comp L 361 
at 387. 
145 Ibid at 373.  
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cession.” 146  The Proclamation both established legal parameters for acquiring 
Indigenous lands and confirmed that Indigenous land rights were communally held, 
continued to exist where they had not been extinguished, and could be extinguished 
only by voluntary surrender to the Crown. 
In Chippewas of Sarnia, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the legal 
framework established by the Royal Proclamation—specifically, the prohibitions on 
alienation and the procedural requirements governing the acquisition of Aboriginal 
lands—was and is a part of the common law and exists independently of the 
Proclamation. 147  Thus, following the Proclamation, Aboriginal title could be 
extinguished by voluntary surrender, though only by surrender to the Crown. 
Following 1982, this is the only manner in which title may be extinguished.  
B. Unilateral Legislation 
Any purported legislative extinguishment of title must meet the three criteria 
outlined above: the legislation must have been intra vires the legislative body in 
question, the legislation must not have been repugnant to any higher order 
constitutional laws or principles, and the legislation must satisfy the clear and plain 
intent standard. In this section I outline these criteria with the aim of providing a 
clear articulation of what types of legislation may have extinguished title during 
distinct historical eras. This requires an analysis of executive and legislative 
authority, Imperial and colonial jurisdiction in the pre-confederation period, and 
federal and provincial jurisdiction in the post-confederation period. 
1. Executive and Legislative Authority  
In the British-Canadian system, law-making authority rests exclusively with the 
legislative branch of government. Executive authority is political or administrative 
and is derived from statute or royal prerogative.148 The scope of authority that 
inheres in each branch of government is essential in determining the capacity to 
extinguish Aboriginal title. In the British and Canadian systems, property rights can 
be extinguished or infringed only under the auspices of explicit legislative authority. 
Property cannot be seized—that is, property rights cannot be extinguished—by the 
executive branch except during wartime, and even then compensation must be 
                                                
146 Ibid at 372.  
147 Chippewas of Sarnia Band v Canada (AG) (2000), 51 OR (3d) 641, 2000 CanLII 16991 at paras 195–
199 (CA) [Chippewas of Sarnia]. Inalienability has also been recognized as a characteristic of 
Aboriginal title quite apart from the Royal Proclamation: see Delgamuukw, supra note 11 at para 113; 
Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 2 at para 74.  
148 Joseph Chitty, A Treatise on the Law of the Prerogatives of the Crown and the Relative Rights and 
Duties of the Subject (London: Joseph Butterworth and Son, 1820) at 2 [Chitty, Prerogatives of the 
Crown]; Christopher Vincenzi, Crown Powers, Subjects and Citizens (London: Pinter, 1998) at 7; Sir 
John G Bourinot, Canada Under British Rule 1760-1900 (London: CJ Clay & Sons, 1900) at 5 
[Bourinot, Canada Under British Rule]. 
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paid.149 The ‘executive taking’ of property has been prohibited since at least the 
Magna Carta in 1215.150 Only under the auspices of explicit legislative authority, 
then, can proprietary interests in land be extinguished.  
Courts have established a degree of judicial oversight over this process by 
requiring a “clear and plain” legislative intent to legally effectuate the 
extinguishment of property rights.151 Further, ambiguities will be interpreted as 
favouring property owners, and courts will look for compensation to be provided 
wherever land is taken pursuant to legislative authority—unless compensation is 
expressly limited by the legislation itself.152 Courts have been consistent in stating 
that the executive branch cannot extinguish property rights in the absence of clear 
and plain legislation permitting such an action.153 Before any of the characteristics 
unique to Aboriginal title are considered, this should be the basic level of protection 
afforded to Aboriginal title lands.154 Any protections that Aboriginal title receives 
pursuant to its status as a constitutionalized Aboriginal right should be considered in 
addition to the protections it receives as a common law property right. Conceptual 
clarity in this respect is important to ensure that the sui generis nature of Aboriginal 
title not be applied in a manner that derogates from the protections afforded property 
rights at common law.155 
                                                
149 Attorney-General v De Keyser’s Royal Hotel Ltd, [1920] AC 508 at 542, 551, [1920] UKHL 1 
(BAILII); Henry Winthrop Ballantine, Blackstone’s Commentaries (Chicago: Blackstone Institute, 
1915) at 466; Burmah Oil Company Ltd v Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75 at 79, [1964] UKHL 6 (BAILII) 
where the House of Lords stated that “[t]he prerogative right of the state to take the citizen’s property is 
founded on necessity” and, at 83, that there is no common law case “suggesting the existence of a 
prerogative right to seize or destroy the subject’s property without compensation.” 
150 Article 39 of the Magna Carta reads in part: “No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseised… 
unless by the lawful judgement of his peers, or by the law of the land.” See Mabel Hill & Albert 
Bushnell Hart, Liberty Documents: With Contemporary Exposition and Critical Comments Drawn 
From Various Writers (New York, Longmans, Green and Co, 1901), at 18 [Hill & Hart, Liberty 
Documents]. Similarly, the Liberty of Subject Act, 1354, 28 Edw III, c 3 reads in part: “no man of what 
estate or condition that he be, should be put out of his lands or tenements, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor 
disinherited, nor put to death, without being brought to answer by due process of law.” Both of these 
provisions were included in the 1628 Petition of Right. Article IV of the Petition restated the provisions 
of the aforementioned Act verbatim, explicitly incorporating the Act. Article III of the same Petition 
incorporated the provision of the Magna Carta quoted above, stating: “And whereas also by the statute 
called 'The Great Charter of the Liberties of England, [the Magna Carta] it is declared and enacted, that 
no freeman may be taken or imprisoned or be disseized of his freehold or liberties, or his free customs, 
or be outlawed or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, but by the lawful judgment of his peers, or by the 
law of the land.” See The Petition of Right, 1628, 3 Car I, c 1, reprinted in Hill & Hart, Liberty 
Documents, ibid at 67–71. 
151 Sparrow, supra note 139 at 1099.   
152 Newcastle Breweries Limited v The King, [1920] 1 KB 854 at 856. 
153 Calder, supra note 140 at 404; Delgamuukw, supra note 11 at para 180.  
154 Kent McNeil, “Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title in Canada: Treaties, Legislation, and Judicial 
Discretion” (2001-2002) 33:2 Ottawa L Rev 301 at 315 (QL) [McNeil, “Extinguishment of Aboriginal 
Title”]. 
155 See John Borrows and Leonard Rotman “The Sui Generis Nature of Aboriginal Rights: Does it Make a 
Difference?” (1997) 36 Alta L Rev 9 at 11–13 (QL).  
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Clarity in this regard is essential because of the uneven language employed 
by the Supreme Court. In Sparrow, for example, the Court referred to the will of the 
“Sovereign” in articulating the clear and plain intent test.156 This language leaves 
open the possibility of executive extinguishment, so long as such extinguishment 
was clearly intended. This is a residue of the St Catherine’s Milling157 decision, in 
which Lord Watson characterized Aboriginal title as a “personal and usufructuary 
right, dependent upon the good will of the Sovereign.”158 This characterization has 
clearly been abandoned in contemporary jurisprudence. In Calder, for example, Hall 
J held that title could only be extinguished by specific legislation passed by a 
competent legislative authority or by surrender to the Crown.159 In particular, the 
Supreme Court has emphasized that Aboriginal title is a proprietary right, due all the 
protections afforded other such rights at common law. As Lamer CJC stated in 
Delgamuukw, the sui generis nature of Aboriginal title does not derogate from the 
protections it receives as a proprietary right at common law:  
This Court has taken pains to clarify that aboriginal title is only “personal” 
in this sense [that it is inalienable except to the Crown], and does not mean 
that aboriginal title is a non-proprietary interest which amounts to no more 
than a licence to use and occupy the land and cannot compete on an equal 
footing with other proprietary interests.160  
As a proprietary right, title could only have been extinguished by clear and plain 
legislation, and compensation would be expected unless stated otherwise in the 
legislation. 
Given some ambiguity in the case law, however, it is important to note that, 
owing to the fact that rights could only be extinguished by the legislative branch, the 
clear and plain intent test applies to legislation, not to the ‘Sovereign’ or ‘Crown’. 
Given this, the question is which legislative bodies had the jurisdiction to extinguish 
title. In the pre-confederation period, this inquiry is concerned with the division of 
powers between the Imperial and colonial legislatures.  
2. Imperial and Colonial Jurisdiction 
The jurisdiction to manage the relationship with Indigenous peoples in the pre-
confederation period rested with the Imperial government. As the Ontario Court of 
Appeal stated in Chippewas of Sarnia: 
                                                
156 As LaForest J wrote in Sparrow: “the Sovereign’s intention must be clear and plain if it is to extinguish 
an aboriginal right”: Sparrow, supra note 139 at 1099.  
157 St Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Company v The Queen (Ontario) (1888), 14 App Cas 46, [1888] 
UKPC 70 (BAILII) [St Catherine’s Milling cited to App Cas]. 
158 Ibid at 54. 
159 Calder, supra note 140 at 402; McNeil, “Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title”, supra note 154 at 312.  
160 Delgamuukw, supra note 11 at para 113; Canadian Pacific Ltd v Paul, [1988] 2 SCR 654 at 677, 91 
NBR (2d) 43 (CanLII).  
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First and foremost, dealings between the English Crown and First Nations 
were viewed as involving relations between sovereign nations to be 
governed by agreements or treaties made by the English Crown and the 
First Nations. Relations with the First Nations were an imperial concern to 
be administered primarily through the exercise of the royal prerogative.161 
Accordingly, the authority to extinguish rights also rested at the Imperial level. As 
Bastarache J stated in R v Sappier; R v Gray, “during the colonial period, the power 
to extinguish aboriginal rights rested with the Imperial Crown.”162 As has been seen 
above, however, extinguishing rights required legislative authority. Accordingly, the 
legal authority to extinguish Aboriginal rights in the pre-confederation period resided 
with the Imperial Parliament, subject to two important exceptions: the authority to 
legislatively extinguish rights could be delegated to colonial authorities; and, in 
colonies acquired by conquest or cession, the royal prerogative included the power to 
legislate until such time as a governor was authorized to establish a legislative 
assembly.163 
The policy of maintaining Imperial control over relations with Indigenous 
nations was in part shaped by a concern that colonists, those closest to Indigenous 
peoples and with the most interest in their lands, could not be trusted to deal with 
Indigenous peoples in a just manner. This concern is reflected in the Royal 
Proclamation and in the body of constitutional law that developed to govern these 
relations. As Bruce Clark wrote:   
Conjure up an image of the imperial government balancing the scales of 
power, the scales weighted on the one hand with the indigenous tribes and 
on the other with the colonial governments of the colonists. Although the 
balance could have been left to a political question, to be determined on an 
ad hoc basis as future events might dictate, it was not. The balance was 
determined instead by established rules of constitutional law, knowable a 
priori. The crucial principles were subordination and delegation – the 
colonial governments were subordinate to the imperial government, and 
could validate only such legislative acts as were within the mandate of 
power expressly delegated by the imperial to the colonial governments.164  
Colonial legislatures could only have extinguished title if they had been delegated 
the authority to do so. The executive and legislative branches of colonial 
governments exercised delegated and subordinate powers and were bound to act 
within the confines, and in accordance with, the constitutional principles and laws 
established by the Imperial government. 
                                                
161 Chippewas of Sarnia, supra note 147 at para 51.  
162 Sappier; Gray, supra note 112 at para 58. 
163 Sir Henry Jenkyns, British Rule and Jurisdiction Beyond the Seas (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1902) at 6; 
Campbell v Hall (1774), 1 Cowp 204 at 213, 98 ER 1045 (KB) (CommonLII) [Campbell (1774)]. 
164 Clark, Native Liberty, supra note 142 at 59 [emphasis in original]. 
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In respect of the colonial executive, the Imperial Crown appointed colonial 
governors by means of a royal commission that conferred upon them powers and 
specific legal authority. 165  A governor’s authority was “derived from his 
commission, and limited to the powers thereby expressly or impliedly entrusted to 
him.” 166  Subsequent formal instructions laid out specific duties and rules of 
conduct.167 A governor’s authority was, therefore, delegated in nature; the executive 
branch of colonial governments was subordinate to the Imperial government and did 
not possess sovereign authority. The specific instruments by which the powers of 
colonial governors were delegated were important in both their form and their 
content. In respect of form, the commissions by which governors were appointed 
were granted “by letters-patent under the great seal.” 168  Subsequent royal 
instructions “bore the signet and sign-manual of the king.” 169  These formal 
mechanisms were the only means by which authority could be delegated.170 It 
follows that other means of purported delegation could not have had the legal effect 
of delegating authority. In light of the extensive correspondence between colonial 
governors and the Colonial Office in London, it is particularly important that the 
form of instrument relied on as evidence of delegation be scrutinized.171 Crucially, 
“it was not open for governors to assume from mere dispatches expressing opinions 
or sentiments a jurisdiction to make laws upon a subject.”172 Only instruments 
bearing the signet and sign-manual of the King or the great seal of Great Britain 
could legally delegate authority and transfer jurisdiction. As Hall J held in Calder, 
governors “had no powers to legislate other than those given in the commission.”173 
Given this, Hall J found that because “neither the Commission nor the Instructions 
contain any power or authorization to extinguish the Indian title, then it follows 
                                                
165 Charles James Tarring, Chapters on the Law Relating to the Colonies, 3d ed (London: Stevens and 
Haynes, 1882) at 33–34 [Tarring, Law Relating to the Colonies]. 
166 Ibid at 33, citing Musgrave v Pulido, (1879) 5 App Cas 102, 49 LJPC 20. See also Clark, Native 
Liberty, supra note 142 at 58–59.  
167 Tarring, Law Relating to the Colonies, supra note 165 at 33–36; Clark, Native Liberty, supra note 142 
at 59; Chitty, Prerogatives of the Crown, supra note 148 at 34–35. 
168  Alpheus Todd, Parliamentary Government in the British Colonies (Boston: Little, Brown, and 
Company, 1880) at 77; Clark, Native Liberty, supra note 142 at 59; Anthony Stokes, A View of the 
Constitution of the British Colonies, in North America and the West Indies, at the Time the Civil War 
Broke Out on the Continent of America (London: B White, 1783) at 150. 
169 Clark, Native Liberty, supra note 142 at 60, citing George Chalmers, Opinions of Eminent Lawyers on 
Various Points of English Jurisprudence Chiefly Concerning the Colonies, Fisheries, and Commerce of 
Great Britain (New York: Burt Franklin, 1971) vol 1 at 225. 
170 This could also be done by Act of the Imperial Parliament, e.g., Quebec Act, 1774 (UK), 14 Geo III, c 
83, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 2, s 8 [Quebec Act, 1774] and Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 
31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5 [Constitution Act, 1867].  
171 Clark, Native Liberty, supra note 142 at 64 
172 Ibid.  
173 Calder, supra note 140 at 406. 
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logically that if any attempt was made to extinguish the title it was beyond the power 
of the Governor or of the Council to do so and, therefore, ultra vires.”174  
The elected house of the typical bicameral colonial legislature was an 
assembly raised by the Governor pursuant to the royal commission received for the 
purpose of establishing government in the colony.175 The law-making power of the 
elected assembly was circumscribed by the royal commission to which it owed its 
existence and was limited to making laws concerning local affairs and for peace, 
order, and good government of the colony.176 The representative assemblies typically 
had the authority to make laws concerning the “interior government” of the 
colony.177 Crucially, “Indian affairs were no concern of the colonial legislatures.”178 
The authority to extinguish Aboriginal title was not within the original grant of 
authority over local matters. Whether the authority of the colonial legislatures was, 
strictly speaking, delegated in nature, is a matter of some debate. Though it is beyond 
the scope of this paper to address that debate in detail, it will suffice here to say that 
the colonial legislatures were subordinate, bound to act within the scope of authority 
outlined in the instruments which brought them into being, and ultimately subject to 
the sovereignty of the Imperial Parliament. Given that the initial grant of legislative 
power does not seem to have included jurisdiction to legislate in respect of Indian 
lands, any colonial legislation relied on to prove extinguishment must have a source 
of authority delegated by a subsequent instrument. 
The picture painted above is relatively straightforward: Jurisdiction to 
extinguish title rested with the Imperial Parliament unless delegated to a colonial 
body; any such delegation must have been effected according to the proper legal 
forms. Though these rules are an adequate starting point, they require further nuance. 
Colonization in Canada has occurred over several centuries. During this time, there 
have been many changes in the law and governance of the Imperial and colonial 
governments, as well as changes in the relationship between the two. Similarly, the 
relationship between Indigenous nations and the Imperial and colonial governments 
has undergone significant change.  
Despite the fact that parliamentary supremacy extended to colonial affairs, 
the royal prerogative continued to play a crucial role. Pursuant to the royal 
prerogative, the Imperial executive held both constitutive and, at times, legislative 
authority. The range of prerogative powers exercisable in a colony, in particular the 
extent of the prerogative legislative authority, was largely determined by the manner 
in which the colony was acquired. According to the prevailing legal norms from the 
                                                
174 Ibid at 413. 
175 Charles Clark, A Summary of Colonial Law, the Practice of the Court of Appeals from the Plantations, 
and of the Laws and Their Administration in All the Colonies (London: S Sweet, A Maxwell, and 
Stevens & Sons, 1834) at 27–28 [Clark, A Summary of Colonial Law]. 
176 Chitty, Prerogatives of the Crown, supra note 148 at 33.  
177 Clark, A Summary of Colonial Law, supra note 175 at 7.  
178 Chippewas of Sarnia, supra note 147 at para 51.  
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18th century onward, colonies could be acquired by settlement, conquest, or 
cession.179 In a colony that had been acquired through conquest or cession, the 
English sovereign (i.e., the executive) possessed a nearly unlimited legislative 
authority in the colony.180 As a conquering power was presumed to hold absolute 
power over conquered or ceded territory and peoples, the executive assumed 
legislative authority in respect of those territories.181  
The granting of representative institutions in a colony, however, 
extinguished the legislative power of the Imperial executive in respect of ordinary 
legislation. 182  In colonies acquired by settlement the situation was somewhat 
different. As “it was not possible to deprive an Englishman of the inestimable 
advantages of English law,”183 the English law was said to follow an English citizen 
wherever they were not under the jurisdiction of another sovereign.184 As a result, 
the prerogative legislative authority of the Sovereign was limited in settled colonies 
from the moment they were so acquired. Thus, the power of the executive to 
extinguish Aboriginal title by way of the prerogative legislative power existed only 
in colonies acquired by cession or conquest, and then only until that colony was 
granted representative institutions. Thereafter, any extinguishment could only have 
occurred by means of Imperial legislation or legislation from a body delegated the 
authority to extinguish title.  
One further complication is the argument that has often been put forward 
that the relationship with Indigenous nations was itself a matter governed by the 
royal prerogative. As Sákéj Henderson has argued: 
The 1743 decision in Mohegan Indians clarified the status of the First 
Nations in the imperial law of Great Britain. It recognised treaty 
federalism and Aboriginal law as the twin bases controlling the common 
law in Canadian colonisation. Henceforth, controversies between 
Aboriginal nations and colonial authorities were to be exclusively under 
                                                
179  Tarring, Law Relating to the Colonies, supra note 165 at 3. See also Arthur Mills, Colonial 
Constitutions: An Outline of the Constitutional History and Existing Government of the British 
Dependencies (London: John Murray, 1856) at 18 [Mills, Colonial Constitutions].  
180 Arthur Berriendale Keith, Responsible Government in the Dominions, 2d ed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1912) vol 1 at 3–4 [Keith, Responsible Government]; Chitty, Prerogatives of the Crown, supra note 148 
at 29; Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial Law (London, UK: Stevens & Sons, 
1966) at 150 [Roberts-Wray, Colonial Law]; Mills, Colonial Constitutions, supra note 179 at 21; 
Tarring, Law Relating to the Colonies, supra note 165 at 15–17. 
181 See Campbell (1774), supra note 163 at 211: “No question was ever started before, but that the King 
has a right to a legislative authority over a conquered country.” See also Tarring, Law Relating to the 
Colonies, supra note 165 at 18; Chitty, Prerogatives of the Crown, supra note 148 at 27, 29. 
182 Tarring, Law Relating to the Colonies, supra note 165 at 15–17; Chitty, Prerogatives of the Crown, 
supra note 148 at 29–30; Mills, Colonial Constitutions, supra note 179 at 19. The only exception being 
“unless, indeed, the Crown had reserved a right of revocation in the instrument by which the 
constitution was granted”: Keith, Responsible Government, supra note 180 at 3. 
183 Keith, Responsible Government, supra note 180 at 1.  
184 Tarring, Law Relating to the Colonies, supra note 165 at 3. 
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his majesty’s foreign jurisdictions, as subject to the royal prerogative, 
rather than the parliament of the United Kingdom or any colonial or local 
assembly. Treaties with Aboriginal nations or tribes created independent 
and separate jurisdictions in the imperial law, as distinct from colonial 
authority.185 
The difficulty with this view is that once colonies became part of “Her Majesty’s 
Dominions” they appear to no longer have fallen under the category of foreign 
jurisdictions as far as British law was concerned. Whether Aboriginal nations were 
considered “foreign jurisdictions” under British law changed over time. In the early 
17th century all colonial activity fell under the purview of the Crown.186 In rejecting 
parliamentary attempts to legislate in respect of the colonies, Ministers told the 
House of Commons that “it was not fit to make laws here for those countries which 
are not yet annexed.”187 Once a territory became a dominion of the Crown, however, 
it is unlikely that the Aboriginal peoples within that territory would have been 
considered part of a foreign jurisdiction. While it may be true that “[t]he provinces 
are constructs of the European imagination,”188 the question of whether Aboriginal 
peoples in colonies that had been classified as dominions were considered foreign 
jurisdictions for the purposes of the prerogative is a question of British law. This 
view, however, has the problematic attribute of accepting without question the ability 
of the British Crown to assert dominion over Aboriginal nations and, by the mere 
assertion of sovereignty, to gain jurisdiction and radical title over their lands. 
Nonetheless, Henderson’s argument speaks to a characterization in British law and 
must be assessed on that basis. 
Insofar as Henderson implies that the prerogative was not subject to the will 
of the Imperial Parliament, he appears to have been mistaken.189 As the Privy 
Council stated in Campbell v Hall, a conquered or ceded country “becomes a 
dominion of the King in the right of his Crown; and, therefore, necessarily subject to 
the Legislature, the Parliament of Great Britain.”190 When a colony was acquired, it 
was acquired in right of the Crown which ipso facto extended the jurisdiction of the 
Imperial Parliament over that territory as far as British law was concerned. While 
Henderson seems to be mistaken about the jurisdiction of ‘the parliament’, the 
broader question of whether the relationship with Indigenous nations was a 
prerogative matter remains somewhat clouded. 
                                                
185 Henderson, “Legal Inheritances”, supra note 103 at 8. See the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, 53 & 54 
Vict, c 37. 
186 Mills, Colonial Constitutions, supra note 179 at 2. 
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188 Sákéj Henderson & Adrian Turner, “Aboriginal Land Claims in the Atlantic Provinces” in Ken Coates, 
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92 UNBLJ     RD UN-B [VOL/TOME 67 
 
While the responsibility for managing the relationship rested with the 
executive branch, this is distinct from the power to extinguish title. This is evident 
when the powers of the executive are looked at closely. The 1784 instructions to 
Governor Thomas Carleton are illustrative of the range of authority governors were 
delegated in respect of Indigenous affairs. Carleton was directed to maintain 
correspondence with the Indians, inducing them to be both good neighbours and 
British Subjects and, further, to enter into treaties of peace and friendship with 
them.191 Governors were delegated the authority to enter into treaties and were 
tasked with maintaining relationships with Indigenous peoples. These relationships 
were political in nature. The nature of the authority delegated to the colonial 
governors, then, reflected the authority of the Imperial Crown.192 That authority was 
limited by its status as the executive branch of government. Aboriginal title could 
only have been extinguished by legislation and legislating was beyond the 
constitutional bounds of the executive branch.  
From the above, it is evident that in the pre-confederation period title could 
only have been extinguished by Imperial legislation or colonial legislation where the 
authority to extinguish title had been delegated according to the proper legal forms. 
The exception to this rule arises in colonies acquired by cession or conquest. There, 
title could have been extinguished by way of prerogative legislation until such time 
as authority to raise a legislative assembly was granted. 
3. Post-Confederation  
In the post-Confederation era, jurisdiction to extinguish Aboriginal rights resided 
with the federal Parliament by way of section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867. 
For a period, this jurisdiction was shared with the Imperial Parliament. As Professor 
McNeil explains, “[t]here can be little doubt that the Imperial Parliament’s authority 
to extinguish Aboriginal title prior to Confederation would have continued thereafter, 
since the Parliament at Westminster retained authority to legislate for Canada when 
it enacted the Constitution Act, 1867.”193 Section 91(24) places in federal hands the 
authority to “make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada, in 
                                                
191 The instruction read:  
63. And Whereas it is highly necessary for Our Service that you should cultivate and 
maintain a strict Friendship and good correspondence with the Indians, Inhabiting within Our 
said Province of New Brunswick, that they may be induced by degrees not only to be good 
Neighbours to our Subjects, but likewise themselves to become good subjects to Us, you are 
therefore to use all proper means to attain those Ends, to have Interviews from time to time, 
with the several heads of the said Indian Nations or Clans and to endeavour to enter into 
Treaty with them promising them Friendship and Protection on Our part. 
 See “Royal Instructions to Thomas Carleton”, in WM Jarvis, ed, Collections of the New Brunswick 
Historical Society (Saint John, NB: 1909) vol 6 at 391, online: 
<archives.gnb.ca/exhibits/forthavoc/html/Royal-Instructions.aspx?culture=en-CA>.  
192  As Charles Clark stated, the “political and military administration is consequently vested in a 
governor”: Clark, A Summary of Colonial Law, supra note 175 at 3.  
193 McNeil, “Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title”, supra note 154 at 322. 
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relation to … Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians.”194 In Delgamuukw, the 
Province of British Columbia put forward a limited reading of section 91(24), 
arguing “that ‘Lands reserved for the Indians’ are lands which have been specifically 
set aside or designated for Indian occupation, such as reserves.”195 Lamer CJC 
rejected this argument, holding that it ran counter to the Privy Council’s decision in 
St Catherine’s Milling where it was held that, had it been intended that section 
91(24) be limited to reserve lands, such a limitation would have been made 
explicit.196 Thus, Lamer CJC held that the power to extinguish title rested with the 
federal government, stating: 
Since 1871, the exclusive power to legislate in relation to “Indians, and 
Lands reserved for the Indians” has been vested with the federal 
government by virtue of s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867. That head 
of jurisdiction, in my opinion, encompasses within it the exclusive power 
to extinguish aboriginal rights, including aboriginal title.197  
As it has been demonstrated that the extinguishment of rights is within the exclusive 
purview of the legislative branch, Lamer CJC’s use of the term ‘federal government’ 
should be understood to refer to the federal Parliament. Put otherwise, since 1867, 
“the exclusive power to extinguish aboriginal rights, including aboriginal title” rested 
with the federal Parliament.198 It is clear that the provinces at no point had the 
capacity to extinguish Aboriginal title. 
4. Conclusions on Extinguishment 
There are, therefore, four types of legislation that may have had the effect of 
extinguishing Aboriginal title: (1) Imperial legislation until 1931; (2) prerogative 
legislation prior to the promise of a representative assembly, or enacted under 
authority delegated by the Imperial Parliament; (3) colonial legislation enacted under 
the delegated authority discussed above; and (4) federal legislation prior to 1982. If 
colonial legislation is relied on, the onus is on the party seeking to demonstrate 
extinguishment to prove that the jurisdiction to do so was delegated by the proper 
legal instruments. 
                                                
194 Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 170, s 91(24). 
195 Delgamuukw, supra note 11 at para 174: “The debate between the parties centred on whether that part 
of s. 91(24) confers jurisdiction to legislate with respect to aboriginal title.” 
196 Ibid.  
197 Ibid at para 173. 
198 Lamer CJC refers to 1871 because that is the date when British Columbia (where the facts of the 
Delgamuukw decision took place) joined confederation. The authority to extinguish existed elsewhere as 
of 1867 or when the province in question joined confederation, whichever date is later.  
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V. EXTINGUISHMENT IN THE MARITIME PROVINCES 
From the foregoing, it is clear that Aboriginal title existed in the Maritime Provinces. 
The questions that remain are where it existed and whether it has been extinguished. 
A party seeking to establish that title has been extinguished in the Maritime 
Provinces would have to demonstrate that title was extinguished by voluntary 
surrender or a unilateral legislative act which met the criteria outlined above. This 
section applies the extinguishment analysis to the Maritime Provinces to provide a 
preliminary assessment of whether, where it has been proven, title has been 
extinguished.  
A. Voluntary Surrender 
As Dickson CJC (as he then was) stated in Simon, “[n]one of the Maritime treaties of 
the eighteenth century cedes land.”199 Similarly, in Marshall #1, Binnie J wrote for 
the majority that “there is no applicable land cession treaty in Nova Scotia.”200 In the 
Simon decision the Crown relied on the fact that the treaties did not cede land to 
argue that they could not be categorized as treaties: Allegedly, a ‘treaty’ that does 
“not deal with the ceding of land or delineation of boundaries” should not be 
considered a treaty as the term is used in section 88 of the Indian Act.201 It is evident 
that no land in the Maritime Provinces was ceded by treaty. 
Voluntary surrenders could occur by means other than treaty. It appears that 
any such surrender would be required to meet the requirements of the Royal 
Proclamation. There is some debate surrounding the application of the Proclamation 
in the Maritime Provinces. While a detailed analysis of the Proclamation’s 
application in the region is a subject owed a paper of its own, it seems reasonably 
clear that future courts will consider the Proclamation to have applied insofar as that 
means that the validity of Indigenous surrenders of land will be assessed in light of 
their adherence to the principles articulated therein. To begin, McLachlin CJC held 
in Marshall; Bernard that “contemporaries viewed the Royal Proclamation as 
applying to Nova Scotia”202 (which then included present-day New Brunswick and, 
as of the issuing of the Proclamation itself, Prince Edward Island and Cape Breton). 
McLachlin CJC thus proceeded “on the basis that [the Proclamation] applied to the 
former colony of Nova Scotia.”203 A party seeking to argue against the application of 
                                                
199 Simon, supra note 112 at 410. At the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, Cromwell JA noted that “the 
Supreme Court of Canada on two occasions has expressed the view that the 1760 - 61 treaties do not 
cede land”: Marshall (NSCA), supra note 28 at para 98. In Isaac (NSCA), supra note 114 at 479, the 
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201 Simon, supra note 112 at 408; Indian Act, RSC 1985, c I-5. 
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the Proclamation, then, would have to argue against clear precedent. This may prove 
difficult in light of the interpretive principles that must be employed. As McLachlin 
CJC stated in Marshall; Bernard, “[t]he Royal Proclamation must be interpreted 
liberally, and any matters of doubt resolved in favour of aboriginal peoples.”204 In 
this respect, the interpretive principles applicable to the Proclamation align with the 
principles of treaty interpretation. The courts have gone somewhat further, though, 
holding that the Proclamation’s status as a “Charter,” “Magna Carta,” or “Indian Bill 
of Rights” must be considered in its interpretation. 205  Given the clear recent 
statement from the Supreme Court confirming the application of the Proclamation 
and the requirement that the Proclamation be interpreted not only liberally and with 
ambiguities being resolved in favour of Indigenous peoples, but in light of the 
importance of the document to them, it seems likely that a future court would find 
the Proclamation to have applied in the Maritime Provinces.  
This conclusion aligns with much of the academic material on the issue.206 
First, the question of whether the Proclamation “applied” must be nuanced. As the 
Proclamation annexed Prince Edward Island and Cape Breton to Nova Scotia, it is 
beyond question that it applied in some respects.207 Further, the Proclamation was 
sent to the Governor of Nova Scotia and, as the Supreme Court noted in Marshall; 
Bernard, communications between the Colonial Office and the government in Nova 
Scotia suggest the Proclamation was intended to apply there.208 The argument that 
the Proclamation did not apply, then, seems to rest on the view that the “Indian 
provisions” did not apply, those being concerned only with lands west of the 
boundary line. On this issue, Mark Walters makes an important clarification. As 
Walters writes, the Proclamation established “rules in relation to two separate 
categories of Indian land.”209 The first category is the land to the west of the Atlantic 
watershed which was set aside as ‘Indian lands’. The Maritime Provinces do not fall 
within this category. The second category includes “all other parts of British North 
America, where settlements were to be permitted.”210 In respect of this second 
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category, the Proclamation’s prohibitions on alienation to parties other than the 
Crown and the procedural requirements mandating a public and voluntary cession 
applied. In all parts of British North America, then, including the Maritime 
Provinces, this latter set of protections afforded by the Proclamation applied and no 
land could be granted for settlement until land had been ceded according to the 
procedures set out therein.211 In light of the above, any purported extinguishment of 
Aboriginal title in the region by voluntary surrender should only be considered valid 
if the alleged ‘surrender’ was consistent with the Proclamation (from 1763 onward). 
These protections have also been held to have been incorporated into the common 
law and to apply regardless of the application of the Proclamation to the territory in 
question.212 
There were certainly many small surrenders in the Maritime Provinces, each 
of which would have to be examined on a case-by-case basis to determine whether 
they conformed to the Royal Proclamation and the fiduciary obligation of the 
Crown. It is beyond the scope of this paper to determine the legality of these many 
surrenders, as they are entangled in a number of competing claims, leases, and 
sales.213 Many sales were made to third parties by Indigenous individuals without the 
consent of the community and much land was settled by squatters whom the 
government lacked the resolve to remove. Lands surrendered in the pre-
confederation period by means other than treaty must be assessed against the 
standards established in the Royal Proclamation. Even the most ambitious of these 
types of surrender, however, represent relatively small areas of land. 
B. Unilateral Legislation 
Now I will assess, in a preliminary manner, the possible extinguishment of title by 
legislation in the Maritime Provinces. The aim here is twofold: to determine which 
legislative bodies had the proper jurisdiction to extinguish title in different eras, and 
to determine whether there are examples of legislation that fits these criteria.214  
                                                
211 There are other grounds on which the application of the Proclamation could be challenged. For 
instance, one could ask whether the Crown had the prerogative authority to legislate in respect of Nova 
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Acadia, or the old colony of Nova Scotia, was ceded to the British by 
French in 1713 by way of the Treaty of Utrecht.215 New Brunswick, over which the 
British gained sovereignty in 1759, remained part of the colony of Nova Scotia until 
1784. Prince Edward Island and Cape Breton remained under French sovereignty 
until 1763 when they were ceded to Britain at the Treaty of Paris and annexed to 
Nova Scotia in the Royal Proclamation.216 Cape Breton became an independent 
colony in 1784 and remained so until 1820, at which point it was re-annexed to Nova 
Scotia.217 The establishment of a colonial government on Prince Edward Island in 
1769 marked the Province’s debut as an independent colony, and an elected 
assembly first met in the colony in 1773.218 Prior to 1784, then, any purported 
extinguishment in peninsular Nova Scotia or New Brunswick can be assessed with 
reference to the actions of the colonial government of Nova Scotia or the Imperial 
government acting in respect of Nova Scotia. From 1763–1769, the same is true of 
Prince Edward Island; for Cape Breton, from 1763–1784 and from 1820 onward.  
A bicameral legislature was not established in Nova Scotia until 1758.219 
Prior to the founding of Halifax in 1749, the government “was vested solely in a 
governor who had command of the garrison stationed at Annapolis.”220 Until that 
point, Nova Scotia was largely under military rule.221 In 1749 the seat of government 
was moved to the newly established settlement at Halifax, with the newly appointed 
Governor Cornwallis instructed to select a twelve-person executive council and to 
call an assembly.222 The power of the executive to legislate pursuant to the royal 
prerogative was therefore limited after 1749. Such a power never existed in the other 
colonies, which were, upon their creation, immediately annexed to a colony which 
had already been granted—and which had established—a legislative assembly of its 
own. Subsequent to 1749, then, Aboriginal title could only have been extinguished 
either by the Imperial Parliament or by a colonial legislature which had been 
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delegated the authority to extinguish such title. In other words, after 1749 on 
peninsular Nova Scotia, 1759 in New Brunswick, and 1763 on Prince Edward Island 
and Cape Breton, any loss of Aboriginal lands could not have extinguished 
Aboriginal title unless supported by legislation passed by a competent legislative 
body. In determining the extinguishment of title in the Maritime Provinces, then, an 
important point is determining whether the colonial assemblies were delegated the 
authority to extinguish title.  
1. Colonial Authority 
As discussed above, the jurisdiction of colonial assemblies was delegated and 
subordinate in nature. To establish extinguishment, a party must thus demonstrate 
either that the initial delegation of authority to the colonial legislatures included the 
authority to extinguish title or that there was a subsequent delegation of authority to 
that effect.  
Colonial legislatures were delegated authority to legislate in respect of the 
“Peace Welfare and good Government” of the colony.223  Determining whether 
‘Peace Welfare and good Government’ included the authority to extinguish 
Aboriginal title is a complicated task. As Sir Roberts-Wray has argued:  
Whether a particular enactment is calculated as matter of fact or policy to 
secure peace, order and good government is not a question into which the 
Courts will inquire. In short, it is apparent that the Courts have attached 
little value to the actual words but have concerned themselves with the 
general doctrine of legislative competence.224 
The phrase is best understood as conferring an expansive (rather than limited) 
authority, seeming only to limit the jurisdiction of the colony to internal matters: 
Colonial legislation could not have extra-territorial application.225 
Nonetheless, it is not clear that this power over local affairs was intended to, 
or did in fact, delegate the authority to extinguish Aboriginal land rights.226 In 
Sappier; Gray, Bastarache J held that “it is not at all clear that the colonial 
                                                
223 This is the wording in the 1749 commission to Thomas Carleton. This wording, or the alternative 
‘peace order and good government’, were a common feature of colonial commissions. ‘Order’ and 
‘welfare’ in this context are functionally synonymous: see Roberts-Wray, Colonial Law, supra note 180 
at 369. 
224 Ibid. 
225 JE Read, “The Early Provincial Constitutions” (1948) 26:4 Can Bar Rev 621 at 636. 
226 It should be noted here that I am attempting to identify the interpretation of the positive law which 
prevailed at the time. The division of powers between the colonial and Imperial governments, the 
authority of the Imperial Parliament to legislate in respect of the colonies, and the role of the royal 
prerogative in managing the relationship with Indigenous peoples were all highly contested and subject 
to modification over time. As Mark Walters stated, “it must be acknowledged that the Crown’s 
prerogative power to regulate relations with Aboriginal peoples within established colonies was 
controversial”: Walters, “Aboriginal Charter”, supra note 206 at 56.  
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legislature of New Brunswick was ever granted the legal authority by the Imperial 
Crown to extinguish aboriginal rights,”227 suggesting that the initial delegation of 
authority to legislate in respect of local matters did not include the authority to 
extinguish such rights. Any authority to extinguish rights, then, would have to have 
come from a subsequent delegation.  
At least in the case of New Brunswick, the colony itself did not believe it 
had jurisdiction to legislate in respect of Indian lands until such delegation had been 
made by the Colonial Office. In seeking to pass legislation permitting the sale of 
Indian reserve lands (which will be discussed below), the colonial government in 
New Brunswick sought advice of the law officers, who opined that the colony could 
not sell such lands absent permission from the Colonial Office. 228  That the 
government sought this permission suggests the law officers were understood to be 
correct. This suggests strongly that the initial delegation of authority was not thought 
to confer an authority to legislatively extinguish Aboriginal title and that a 
subsequent delegation would be required.  
I will now look to the specific legislation, beginning with the clear and plain 
intent test and then returning to the issue of legislative competence.  
2. Clear and Plain Intent 
Most of the extinguishment claims in the Maritime Provinces have been dismissed 
because the legislation relied on to demonstrate extinguishment did not satisfy the 
clear and plain intent test. This is important in two respects. First, as the legislation 
discussed here has already been brought forward by the Crown to ground a claim of 
extinguishment, there is good reason to believe that Crown attorneys believed this 
legislation to be that which had the best chance of success. Second, as will be seen, 
the legislation that has been subject to (and which has failed to satisfy) the clear and 
plain intent test is that which would have extinguished title to the greatest amount of 
land.  
In the Bernard litigation, the Crown relied at the trial and appellate levels 
on four pre-confederation statutes to prove extinguishment.229 The first was an 1840 
Act entitled An Act to provide for the more effectual prevention of Trespasses and 
protection of Timber growing on Crown lands within this Province.230 The 1840 Act 
                                                
227 Sappier; Gray, supra note 112 at para 58.  
228 Cuthbertson, Stubborn Resistance, supra note 213 at 43.  
229 3 Vict, c 77. See Bernard (NBCA), supra note 63 at para 181 (Daigle JA). 
230 The remaining three were: an 1850 act entitled An Act for the better prevention of Trespasses on Crown 
Lands and Private Property, 13 Vict, c 7; a revision of that 1850 Act, entitled Of Trespasses on Lands, 
Private Property, and Lumber, RSNB 1854, c 133, in the Revised Statutes of New Brunswick 1854, c 
133; and an 1862 amendment to chapter 133 of the Revised Statutes, in An Act further to amend Chapter 
133, Title xxxiv, of the Revised Statutes, “Of trespasses on lands, private property, and lumber”, SNB 
1862, 25 Vict, c 24: Bernard (NBCA), supra note 63 at paras 183–184 (Daigle JA). As can be seen, the 
Crown in fact relied on two pieces of legislation and an additional two legislative amendments to the 
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“prohibits any person from cutting, felling, removing or destroying various species 
of trees and lumber made from them without right derived from the Crown to do 
so.”231  
A later 1850 Act made it a misdemeanour offense for anyone to remove 
logs or timber from any “granted or ungranted” lands without legal authority.232 As 
explained by Robertson JA, the Act further provided that:  
[T]he property in timber taken from Crown lands held under lease or 
licence is in the lessee or licensee. Section 3 authorizes the lessee or 
licensee to recover damages in any action for trespass or replevin. The 
Crown submits that in recognizing a licensee to be the owner of the 
timber, the legislation negates any notion of a right vested in an aboriginal 
community.233 
This last piece of legislation the Crown put forward expanded the definition of 
‘licensee’ so that the licensee could bring an action despite “any law, usage or 
custom to the contrary.”234 While Robertson JA recognized that this phrase may 
seem to include Aboriginal rights, he dismissed this possibility, holding: 
This is true until one places the phrase in its historical context. Under the 
common law and equity a person who might otherwise be labelled a 
trespasser could assert a right to enter on Crown lands for logging 
purposes provided that person could establish, for example, adverse 
possession or a profit à prendre. It seems to me that the true purpose of the 
1862 amendment is to extinguish any non-consensual right to cut Crown 
timber that a person may have acquired through the application of 
common law and equitable principles. In the present case, we are dealing 
with a right established under a consensual agreement and, therefore, the 
legislation could not have the effect of implicitly extinguishing a right 
which arises by agreement and not by prescription. With respect to 
aboriginal title, it arises because of historical occupation prior to the 
assertion of British sovereignty, not by prescription. The Indians were first 
in time and cannot be compared to someone who squats on another 
person’s lands.235  
Importantly, Robertson JA held that the source of Aboriginal title—the pre-
sovereignty occupation of the land—distinguishes title from the customary and 
usage-based rights contemplated by the Act.  
                                                                                                               
1850 Act. The Crown also relied on the 1862 amendment in Sappier; Gray (where the claimants sought 
a declaration of Aboriginal right, rather than Aboriginal title), supra note 112 at para 59. 
231 Bernard (NBCA), supra note 63 at para 181 (Daigle JA). 
232 Ibid at para 182 (Robertson JA). 
233 Ibid. 
234 Ibid at para 184 (Robertson JA). 
235 Ibid at para 186 (Robertson JA). 
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The salient feature of the legislation relied on by the Crown to demonstrate 
extinguishment in Bernard was that it dealt with access to Crown lands. As 
Robertson JA noted, the Crown’s argument boiled down to the claim “that by vesting 
licensees and lessees with ownership of timber growing on Crown lands, the 
legislature intended to extinguish aboriginal title and any treaty right to harvest and 
sell timber growing on the same lands.”236 Robertson JA disagreed, holding that the 
statutes controlling access or granting timber licences to Crown lands did not possess 
the clear and plain intent required to extinguish Aboriginal and treaty rights.237  
This reasoning was adopted again by the New Brunswick Court of Appeal 
in the Gray decision, where Robertson JA held that his “concurring opinion and that 
of Justice Daigle in Bernard is a sufficient basis for purposes of disposing of any 
argument that an existing aboriginal right was extinguished by either pre- or post-
Confederation provincial legislation.”238 In the Sappier litigation, in which Maliseet 
individuals from the Woodstock First Nation relied on treaty and Aboriginal rights to 
harvest lumber from Crown lands as a defense to a charge of unauthorized 
possession of lumber taken from Crown lands, the Crown did “not allege that the 
right was extinguished by either pre- or post-Confederation legislation” at the 
appellate level.239 Despite having made this concession at the New Brunswick Court 
of Appeal, the Crown brought the extinguishment issue again before the Supreme 
Court. As discussed above, Bastarache J, writing for a near unanimous court (with 
Binnie J writing a concurring decision), agreed with the New Brunswick Court of 
Appeal’s characterization of the legislation being relied on by the Crown as 
essentially regulatory in nature, relying on Sparrow to support the holding that the 
regulation of the exercise of a right does not extinguish the right.240 
In Nova Scotia, the extinguishment of a treaty right to harvest timber under 
the 1760-61 treaties and the extinguishment of Aboriginal title were addressed by the 
Court of Appeal in the Marshall decision.241 Here, the Crown relied on two statutes, 
An Act to Prevent Waste and Destruction of Pine or other Timber Trees, on certain 
reserved and un-granted Lands in this Province 242  and An Act concerning 
Trespasses to Crown Property,243 to prove extinguishment of both the asserted treaty 
right and Aboriginal title. The Crown argued that because these Acts, which 
prohibited the removal of timber from Crown lands, did not explicitly exempt 
Aboriginal peoples, any rights enjoyed prior to enactment of the legislation were 
                                                
236 Ibid at para 185 (Robertson JA). 
237 Ibid at para 187 (Robertson JA). 
238 R v Gray, 2004 NBCA 291 at para 25, 273 NBR (2d) 157 (CanLII), cited with approval in Sappier; 
Gray, supra note 112 at para 56. 
239 R v Sappier, 2004 NBCA 295 at para 3, 273 NBR (2d) 93 (CanLII) [Sappier (NBCA)]. 
240 Sappier; Gray, supra note 112 at 58–60. 
241 Marshall (NSCA), supra note 28 at paras 60–68, 237–248.  
242 3 Geo (1774), c 3. 
243 1859, c 22. 
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extinguished. Cromwell JA rejected this view and, like the New Brunswick Court of 
Appeal in Bernard, Sappier, and Gray, drew on a long line of Supreme Court 
decisions to support the position that regulating the exercise of a right did not 
demonstrate extinguishment.244 
The clear and plain intent standard will be difficult to satisfy in respect of 
pre-confederation legislation; with a notable exception that will be dealt with below, 
there is no legislation from that era that purports to extinguish the exercise of 
Aboriginal rights or title. Absent a judicial modification of the clear and plain intent 
standard to allow a greater scope for incidental extinguishment, it is very unlikely 
that pre-confederation legislation, with the possible exception of that analyzed 
below, could have extinguished title.  
C. Instances of Possible Extinguishment 
Though it is not possible in this space to cover all possible instances of legislative 
extinguishment in detail, a few words can be said in respect of those pieces of 
legislation, other than those already addressed by courts, which seem on their surface 
most likely to have extinguished title.245 
1. Colonial Legislation 
No colonial legislation dealt directly with Indigenous peoples until mid-19th century 
attempts to secure the title of squatters on Indigenous lands, settle Indigenous 
peoples in agricultural communities, and sell off reserve lands.246 These Acts were: 
in New Brunswick, An Act to regulate the management and disposal of the Indian 
Reserves in this Province;247 in Nova Scotia, An Act to Provide for the Instruction 
and Permanent Settlement of the Indians;248 and in Prince Edward Island, An Act 
relating to the Indians of Prince Edward Island.249 In light of the limited space 
available here, I will focus only on the New Brunswick 1844 Act.  
As the title of the New Brunswick 1844 Act suggests, its purpose was to 
dispose of “unused” Indian reserve lands.250 The immediate aim of the Act was to 
                                                
244 Marshall (NSCA), supra note 28. 
245 For a detailed analysis see Hamilton, Aboriginal Title in Canada’s Maritime Provinces, supra note 1 at 
122–132.  
246 Upton, Indian-White Relations, supra note 92 at 202. 
247 7 Vict, c 47 (1844) [New Brunswick 1844 Act]. For a detailed account of the Act see Cuthbertson, 
Stubborn Resistance, supra note 213. 
248 5 Vict, c 16 (1842). 
249 19 Vict, c 10 (1856), reprinted in Revised Statutes of Prince Edward Island, 1856, c 10. 
250 It is important to note that the Act applies to reserve lands, not title lands more broadly, though it is 
likely that the locations of the original reserves correspond quite closely to areas where title would be 
most easily proven (such as village sites): Prins, Cultural Survival, supra note 110 at 168. 
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open desirable lands to settlement, agricultural development, and resource 
exploitation. Like similar Acts passed in the other Maritime Provinces and the 
Canadas in this period, the Act was cast by proponents as a means of ameliorating 
the condition of the Indians by settling them in agricultural communities and 
“civilizing” them.251 The Act granted power to the Lieutenant-Governor, on the 
advice of the Council, to appoint individuals to survey Indian reserve lands, to 
“distinguish the improved from the unimproved lands,” and to determine which 
lands were fit for settlement.252 The lands so identified were then to be leased or sold 
pursuant to the procedures established under the Act, which required lands to be 
publicly auctioned to the highest bidder.253 The Act included a suspending clause 
requiring it to receive royal approbation before it could be enacted;254 assent was 
given on 3 September 1844.255  
The alienations that took place under the auspices of these Acts amounted to 
over 10,000 acres in New Brunswick alone.256 As discussed above, it seems that 
these alienations must be assessed in light of the procedural requirements established 
in the Royal Proclamation. Put simply, “a surrender required a voluntary, informed, 
communal decision to give up the land.”257 The question of whether the decision to 
sell or lease lands pursuant to this legislation was voluntary, informed and 
communal, is a question of fact that I cannot speak to conclusively here. There is 
clear evidence that in many cases the Indigenous peoples resisted the sale of their 
reserve lands.258 In any case, where such resistance is evident the Proclamation 
would serve to invalidate the alienation. There is also evidence that in some 
instances Indian Commissioners sought the approval of communities for the sale of 
lands. 259  Should it be demonstrated that the consent of a community, given 
voluntarily and on an informed basis, was conveyed to the government, the 
Proclamation would not stand in the way of an otherwise valid sale.  
Even if consent for a sale were given, however, the procedural requirements 
of the Proclamation may pose further problems for land transactions conducted 
under these Acts. The third clause of the Proclamation mandates that no sales of 
                                                
251 Cuthbertson, Stubborn Resistance, supra note 213 at 22–38. 
252 New Brunswick 1844 Act, supra note 247, s 1. 
253 Ibid, s 2. 
254 Ibid, s 13. 
255 Acts of the General Assembly of her Majesty’s Province of New Brunswick, passed in the year 1845 
(Fredericton, NB: J Simpson, 1845) at 149. The Act further required that notice of the auction be given 
in the Royal Gazette sixty days prior to the auction and that handbills “be posted in three of the most 
public places in the county where such Reserves are situate”: New Brunswick 1844 Act, supra note 247, 
s 2. 
256 Upton, Indian-White Relations, supra note 92 at 112. 
257 Chippewas of Sarnia, supra note 147 at paras 20, 199. 
258 Upton, Indian-White Relations, supra note 92 at 84, 88–89, 96, 115.  
259 Ibid at 102, 105. 
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lands reserved to the Indians may be made to private persons.260 By the terms of the 
Proclamation, alienations could only be made to the Crown; only once the Crown 
purchased the land could it be granted to settlers.261 Under the regime established by 
the New Brunswick and Nova Scotia legislation, purchases were made directly by 
third parties. Further, the proceeds of the sales did not go directly to the Indigenous 
peoples, but were to be held in a fund for their benefit—a fund over which they had 
no control.262 It is not clear whether the fact that the government was facilitating the 
sale would satisfy a court that the spirit of the Proclamation had been followed, but 
given the Supreme Court’s numerous holdings that the Proclamation “must be 
interpreted liberally, and any matters of doubt resolved in favour of aboriginal 
peoples,”263 there is a strong argument in favour of giving a strict interpretation to 
the prohibitions on alienations to parties other than the Crown. Indeed, such an 
interpretation would align with the overarching purpose of implementing procedural 
safeguards through the Proclamation, which was to protect Indigenous lands from 
being fraudulently and dishonestly taken, particularly by having the Imperial 
government provide a measure of control against the actions of the colonists. On this 
interpretation, even consent of the Indigenous community could not save sales of 
land under the Act. 
A party seeking to rely on the sales made pursuant to this legislation as 
evidence of extinguishment would bear the burden of demonstrating that the colonial 
legislatures were competent to extinguish Aboriginal title. Again, this would require 
demonstrating that the authority to extinguish title had been delegated according to 
the proper legal procedures. The authority to sell lands under the New Brunswick 
1844 Act, for example, was ‘delegated’ by means of a dispatch from the Colonial 
Office. As noted above, it is not clear that delegation by dispatch could legally 
transfer authority.  
2. Imperial Legislation 
Most of the Imperial legislation directed specifically at New Brunswick and Prince 
Edward Island dealt with customs and duties, including regulating the importation of 
rum for sale in the Canadas, opening ports to trade, governing trade between the 
Maritime Provinces, and finalizing New Brunswick’s borders. 264  The lone 
                                                
260 Patterson, Mi’kmaq Treaty Handbook, supra note 116 at 11. 
261 Walters, “Aboriginal Charter”, supra note 206 at 53. 
262 Cuthbertson, Stubborn Resistance, supra note 213 at 42–65.   
263 See, e.g., Marshall; Bernard, supra note 12 at 86; Nowegijick, supra note 204 at 36. 
264 See, e.g., An Act for the Settlement of the Boundaries between the Provinces of Canada and New 
Brunswick, 14 & 15 Vict, c 63 (The New Brunswick Boundary Act, 1851). See also a follow up Act in 
1857 explaining the 1851 Act: An Act to explain an Act for the Settlement of the Boundaries between the 
Provinces of Canada and New Brunswick, 20 & 21 Vict, c 34. The Customs Act 1843, 6 & 7 Vict, c 84, 
s 23, allowed for produce from the Maine portion of the Saint John River watershed to be traded in as if 
produced in New Brunswick. The Importation Act 1811, 51 Geo 3, c 48, allowed rum to be imported 
into the Canadas from the Maritime Provinces. 
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exceptions appear to be two 1834 Acts creating land acquisition companies: An Act 
for granting certain Powers to the New Brunswick and Nova Scotia Land 
Company265 and An Act for granting certain Powers to “the British American Land 
Company”.266 As the names suggest, these companies were “established for the 
Purpose of purchasing, holding, improving, clearing, settling, and cultivating, letting, 
leasing, exchanging, selling, and disposing of waste Lands, and other Lands, 
Tenements, and Hereditaments.”267 In short, the land companies functioned as a 
means of privatizing the settlement process, with companies being permitted to 
purchase Crown lands at discount rates on the condition that they build the 
infrastructure necessary to facilitate settlement.268 The companies were then tasked 
with selling the lands to prospective settlers.  
In assessing whether the Acts may have extinguished Aboriginal title, 
competence is not at issue. These Acts may, however, prove problematic where 
constitutional repugnancy is concerned. Should Aboriginal title be proven to lands to 
which the New Brunswick Company held the first Crown-derived title, a party 
seeking to demonstrate that this acquisition extinguished title would be required to 
demonstrate that the acquisition was not repugnant to prevailing constitutional laws 
and principles. I have found no evidence that the 589,000-acre purchase made by the 
Company in York County, which sits primarily in traditional Maliseet territory and 
extends into traditional Mi’kmaw territory as well, was preceded by an Indigenous 
surrender of land pursuant to the procedural terms of the Royal Proclamation.269 It is 
important to recall that even surveying the land without Indigenous consent is a 
violation of the Proclamation. Further, the interpretation of the Peace and Friendship 
Treaties articulated above would require that the Indigenous interest be purchased or 
ceded to any areas outside those already settled by the British in 1726.  
If the land in question was not purchased or ceded, the Act enabling the 
Company’s activities must satisfy the clear and plain intent test if it is to be relied on 
as evidence of extinguishment. The Imperial Parliament could, if it wished, legislate 
contrary to the Royal Proclamation,270 though extinguishment must still be assessed 
on the basis of the clear and plain intent standard. The New Brunswick and Nova 
                                                
265 4 & 5 Will 4, c 24 [New Brunswick and Nova Scotia Land Company Act].  
266 4 & 5 Will 4, c 25. 
267 New Brunswick and Nova Scotia Land Company Act, supra note 265, s 1. 
268 The company was to “make, form, erect, and build Roads, Canals, Drains, Bridges, and other internal 
Communications, Houses, Schools, Chapels, Mills, Wharfs, and other Buildings and Works necessary 
or expedient for the Occupation, Planting, and profitable Cultivation or Improvement of any such 
Lands”: ibid. 
269 For detailed information on the lands disposed of through the New Brunswick Land Company, See 
Professor Bruce Elliot, “Emigrant Recruitment by the New Brunswick Land Company: The Pioneer 
Settlers of Stanley and Harvey” published in four parts in (2004) 26:4 Generations: The Journal of the 
New Brunswick Genealogical Society 50; (2005) 27:1 Generations 34; (2005) 27:2 Generations 11; 
(2005) 27:3 Generations 7. Extensive information is available online: 
<http://history.earthsci.carleton.ca/company/history/elliott1.htm>. 
270 See, e.g., Quebec Act, 1774, supra note 170. 
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Scotia Land Company Act granted the power to purchase and re-sell or otherwise 
dispose of “waste Lands, and other Lands, Tenements, and Hereditaments.”271 It also 
granted subsurface rights in lands acquired under the Act. Though the Act stopped 
short of an explicit extinguishment of title, the standard the courts have applied falls 
somewhat short of requiring an explicit statement. In Calder, Hall J rejected the view 
that general land legislation could extinguish title, holding instead that 
extinguishment requires “specific legislation.”272 The first question, then, is whether 
the terminology in the Act (‘waste Lands, and other Lands, Tenements, and 
Hereditaments’) contemplates Indigenous lands. As seen in the analysis of the New 
Brunswick 1844 Act, ‘waste lands’ was a term that indicated that lands were unused 
or uncultivated and was used in the context of that Act to describe Indian reserve 
lands that had not been cultivated or improved. The phrase ‘other Lands, Tenements, 
and Hereditaments’ is certainly broad enough to include Indigenous land rights. The 
question here is whether the phrase is too broad and falls into the category of general 
land legislation. Lamer CJC’s statement in Gladstone is instructive here:  
While to extinguish an aboriginal right the Crown does not, perhaps, have 
to use language which refers expressly to its extinguishment of aboriginal 
rights, it must demonstrate more than that, in the past, the exercise of an 
aboriginal right has been subject to a regulatory scheme.273 
The distinction drawn here is between a general regulatory scheme on the one hand 
and an explicit statement of extinguishment on the other. This distinction is reflected 
in Daigle JA’s reasoning in Bernard where he held that creating regulatory regimes 
governing the use of Crown land and licensing regimes regarding the timber on those 
lands was insufficient to extinguish Aboriginal rights. 274  The facts here are 
somewhat different. This is not a case of imposing a regulatory scheme which has 
the effect of limiting the full exercise of a right; rather, it is a grant of land so 
complete that it seems inimical to the existence of any other interest. While it is clear 
that as a general proposition a grant cannot extinguish rights, in this instance we are 
dealing not with a grant, but with a right to purchase enabled by Imperial legislation. 
In this light, it seems the interest of the New Brunswick Company sits between the 
two poles identified by Lamer CJC in Gladstone. While the legislation does not 
explicitly extinguish rights or title, nor is it merely general or regulatory in nature. 
Adoption of a somewhat different articulation of the clear and plain intent test may 
yield a clearer result in this case. In Van der Peet, McLachlin J (as she then was), 
writing in dissent, articulated a clear and plain standard that would require an 
“indication that the government of the day considered the aboriginal right on the one 
hand, and the effect of its proposed action on that right on the other.”275 McLachlin J 
would have required evidence that the government of the day had the Aboriginal 
                                                
271 New Brunswick and Nova Scotia Land Company Act, supra note 265, s 1.  
272 Calder, supra note 140 at 402. 
273 R v Gladstone, [1996] 2 SCR 723 at para 34, 137 DLR (4th) 648 (CanLII).  
274 Bernard (NBCA), supra note 63 at paras 180–187 (Robertson JA). 
275 Van der Peet, supra note 138 at para 289. 
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right in question in mind and made a deliberate decision to legislate in a manner 
incommensurate with the existence of that right, even if extinguishment did not need 
to be expressly stated in the legislation. The belief among many legislators in the 19th 
century that Indigenous peoples in the Maritimes possessed no land rights 
whatsoever outside of Indian reserves (themselves considered to be on Crown land) 
would, on this reading, seem to preclude satisfaction of the clear and plain intent 
standard.276 Further, the term ‘waste lands’ as used in the legislation was likely 
intended to refer only to Crown lands. It seems highly unlikely, for example, that the 
Act was intended to apply to privately owned lands that were going unused. While 
some early grants were allowed to escheat if they went unused, this is much different 
from permitting the taking of privately held lands. It seems likely, then, that the Act 
was only intended to apply to lands held by the Crown that were unburdened by any 
other interest, which would exclude Aboriginal title lands. 
The legislative history of the Imperial Parliament in respect of Nova Scotia 
is much the same; trade dominated the agenda, with one important exception. Every 
year from 1748–1779, the Imperial Parliament approved money for the settlement of 
Nova Scotia—specifically, “for supporting, maintaining, and enlarging the 
Settlement of his Majesty’s Colony of Nova Scotia.” 277  Thus, the settlement 
provisions of the Governor’s commission to Cornwallis, which allowed for the 
grating of lands for settlement, seem to have been drafted pursuant to authority 
granted by enabling legislation from the Imperial Parliament. This would have 
allowed the Governor to settle lands in Nova Scotia while the enabling legislation 
continued to be passed annually and would have extended to present-day New 
Brunswick and Prince Edward Island, after those colonies became part of Nova 
Scotia (Prince Edward Island until 1769; New Brunswick until 1784). 
The authority to settle lands, however, should not necessarily be equated 
with the authority to extinguish rights. It is well established that the Crown possessed 
the authority to create interests in land by granting Crown land.278 Rather than 
delegating authority to the Crown to settle lands, the Supply Acts simply authorized 
the expenditures required by the Crown to carry out its prerogative activity of 
granting Crown lands. How the ‘Crown lands’ came to be acquired is another 
question, but we should recall that no Crown lands legislation has yet been before the 
courts which has been found to satisfy the clear and plain intent test.  
3. Federal Legislation 
Federal legislation has yet to be relied on to demonstrate extinguishment of title. 
There is little federal legislation that, on its face, extinguishes or could be read as 
extinguishing title. The federal government clearly had the authority to extinguish 
                                                
276 For an account of the views held by 19th century Maritime Intellectuals concerning the land rights of 
Aboriginal peoples, see Bell, “Amerindian Dispossession”, supra note 115. 
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title from 1867–1982. However, any legislation relied on to demonstrate 
extinguishment would be subject to the clear and plain intent test. The lone exception 
to this is the view that statutes of limitation that operate as federal legislation may 
have the effect of extinguishing title.279  
VI. CONCLUSION 
An analysis of the relevant case law, legal scholarship, and historical material 
demonstrates that Aboriginal title can be proven to have existed in the Maritime 
Provinces at the date of the assertion of British sovereignty. The clear embrace of the 
territorial conception of Aboriginal title in the Tsilhqot’in decision reinforces the 
view that title can likely be proven to have existed in the region on the basis of 
properly pleaded title litigation supported by a reasonably complete evidentiary 
record. In the Maritime Provinces, Aboriginal title is recognized and protected both 
at common law and in the Treaties of Peace and Friendship. Once title has been 
proven, the question becomes whether or not it has been extinguished.  
It is clear that Aboriginal title was not ceded by treaty. It also appears that it 
was not extinguished by legislation in either the pre- or post-confederation periods. 
The manner in which Indigenous peoples were dispossessed of their lands—by 
assuming all land under British sovereignty could be leased, granted, and sold at the 
pleasure of the Crown—violated the common law, the Royal Proclamation, and the 
Treaties of Peace and Friendship. This process was not supported by legislation and, 
as such, could not have extinguished title. In point of fact, this approach was made 
possible only by the adoption of a terra nullius doctrine which denied the existence 
of Aboriginal rights contrary to both British law of the 18th and 19th centuries and 
contemporary Canadian law.  
When Professor Brian Slattery spoke about Aboriginal title at the University 
of New Brunswick in 1999, he closed by saying: “To my mind, then, the question of 
aboriginal title in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia is very much alive and will 
continue to preoccupy the courts of those provinces for some years to come.”280 This 
is as true today as it was then, and the Tsilhqot’in decision suggests that the courts 
may continue to be occupied for many years yet. As has been argued in this paper, it 
is likely that title has yet to be extinguished in the region and remains a legal interest 
where it can be proven to have existed.  
                                                
279 McNeil, “Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title”, supra note 154 at 325. 
280 Slattery, “Some Thoughts”, supra note 126 at 40. 
